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Real Copyright Reform 
Jessica Litman  
ABSTRACT: A copyright system is designed to produce an ecology that 
nurtures the creation, dissemination, and enjoyment of works of authorship. 
When it works well, it encourages creators to generate new works, assists 
intermediaries in disseminating them widely, and supports readers, 
listeners, and viewers in enjoying them. If the system poses difficult entry 
barriers to creators, imposes demanding impediments on intermediaries, or 
inflicts burdensome conditions and hurdles on readers, then the system fails 
to achieve at least some of its purposes. The current U.S. copyright statute is 
flawed in all three respects. In this Article, I explore how the current 
copyright system is failing its intended beneficiaries. The foundation of 
copyright law’s legitimacy, I argue, is built on its evident benefits for creators 
and for readers. That foundation is badly cracked, in large part because of 
the perception that modern copyright law is not especially kind to either 
creators or to readers; instead, it concentrates power in the hands of the 
intermediaries who control the conduits between creators and their audience. 
Those intermediaries have recently used their influence and their copyright 
rights to obstruct one another’s exploitation of copyrighted works. I argue 
that the concentration of copyright rights in the hands of intermediaries 
made more economic sense in earlier eras than it does today. The key to real 
copyright reform, I suggest, is to reallocate copyright’s benefits to give more 
rights to creators, greater liberty to readers, and less control to copyright 
intermediaries. 
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The copyright statute is old, outmoded, inflexible, and beginning to 
display the symptoms of multiple systems failure. Congress enacted the 
current law more than thirty years ago. Most of its essential provisions had 
been drafted years earlier. Copyright lobbyists wrote the 1976 Copyright 
Act1 in the course of protracted multilateral negotiations. The statute 
includes a host of provisions that resolve difficult disputes by adopting 
detailed specifications. It replaced its predecessor statute’s statements of 
general principle with particular language rooted in the technology and 
markets of the 1960s and early 1970s.2 The statute was not well-designed to 
withstand change, and has aged badly. The details of specific solutions have 
become irrelevant or obsolete in the face of social, cultural, and 
technological change.3 Copyright-intensive businesses have come to 
Congress insisting on new specifications to solve new problems.4 In the 
ensuing process of inter-industry negotiations to tailor statutory proposals to 
the quirks and caprice of affected interests, the specifications have attracted 
a swarm of limitations, qualifications, restrictions, and conditions as a 
compliant Congress inserted them into the law.5 Today, title 17 of the United 
States Code is a swollen, barnacle-encrusted collection of incomprehensible 
prose.6 
Historians and copyright lawyers with long memories know that we’ve 
faced this problem before.7 Copyright law’s confrontation with evolving 
technology has been a near-constant theme since Congress enacted its first 
copyright law in 1790.8 More than once in the past, copyright laws have 
 
 1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–1205 (2006)). 
 2. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–34, 54–63, 122–45 (2d ed. 2006). Compare, 
e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (defining scope of and exceptions to 
exclusive right to perform musical compositions publicly for profit), with Copyright Act of 1976 
§ 110 (listing exemptions from public performance right).  
 3. LITMAN, supra note 2, at 57–63, 197–202. 
 4. See, e.g., Performance Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009); Fair 
Copyright in Research Works Act of 2009, H.R. 801, 111th Cong. (2009); Shawn Bentley 
Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008); Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Act of 2007, S. 2317, 110th Cong. (2007); Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 
2560, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 
119 Stat. 218 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.); Satellite 
Home Viewing Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 
3393 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).  
 6. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(2), 114. 
 7. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONG., REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1902, S. DOC. NO. 57-6, at 64 (2d Sess. 1902), available at http://www. 
copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-1902.pdf; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law 
of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 515–16 (1945). 
 8. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
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grown badly outdated before copyright-affected industries could muster the 
political influence to persuade Congress to enact new ones. The current law 
may break down in more extreme ways than in the past, and the law’s 
language may be many times longer, more detailed, and less 
comprehensible than in earlier episodes, but this sort of difficulty has 
plagued copyright history repeatedly.9 When faced with this problem in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, lawyers for copyright-intensive interests 
pursued several strategies to enable them to make do. First, copyright 
lawyers avoided inconvenient statutory language by persuading courts to 
interpret the words of the statute to mean one thing in one context, and a 
very different thing in another.10 Second, they negotiated a series of band-
aid solutions with other copyright interests in which they agreed to behave 
as if the statute on the books said what they wished it did.11 Third, they sat 
down with one another and tried to come up with a revision of the copyright 
statute that would scratch their respective itches. That process always took 
much longer than they expected, but, eventually, copyright lobbyists 
generated the language of a statute that Congress obligingly enacted into 
 
 9. Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 
(1989). 
 10. Perhaps the best-known example is the meaning of the word “publication” under 
sections 10 and 19 of the 1909 Copyright Act. See Am. Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 
744 (2d Cir. 1956) (“[T]he courts apply different tests of publication depending on whether 
plaintiff is claiming protection because he did not publish and hence has a common law claim 
of infringement—in which case the distribution must be quite large to constitute 
‘publication’—or whether he is claiming under the copyright statute—in which case the 
requirements for publication are quite narrow.”). Compare Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 
702 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that distribution of one hundred copies without notice to small 
group constituted general publication and divested copyright), and White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 
744 (9th Cir. 1952) (holding distribution of twenty copies with a cover letter suggesting 
recipients pass the copies on constituted divestive general publication), with King v. Mister 
Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that distribution of many copies to 
the press from the press tent was only a limited publication, which did not forfeit copyright). 
Today we see something similar with computer-mediated uses: Copyright owners have 
persuaded courts that a work is fixed for the purpose of the creation of an infringing copy as 
soon as it appears in the random access memory (“RAM”) of a computer, but do not argue that 
appearance in RAM is sufficient fixation for the purpose of copyright’s vesting. Aaron 
Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). Similarly, copyright 
owners have argued that the transmission of a single copy over a network should count as 
publication for the purposes of infringement, but have denied that transmitting a single copy 
triggers the Library of Congress deposit obligations that attach to a work upon initial 
publication. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 407. 
 11. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 47–50. For a current analogue, see, for example, Principles 
for User Generated Content Services, UGCPRINCIPLES, http://www.ugcprinciples.com/ (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2010). 
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law. The resulting statute was, of course, longer, less flexible, and more 
vulnerable to obsolescence than the one it replaced.12 
Copyright insiders, having watched (or participated in) some of the 
early ameliorative moves this time around, are beginning to make noises 
suggestive of a new round of statutory overhaul. Groups are meeting 
privately to generate preferred solutions to copyright law problems.13 
Businesses are asking their pet members of Congress to float statutory 
balloons.14 Various trade associations are trying to position themselves to 
claim that the items at the top of their wish lists are already well-established 
under current law.15 
There’s some queasiness attached to launching a new copyright 
overhaul. Copyright revision is lengthy and expensive, even in the best of 
circumstances. The number of interests affected by copyright is huge, and 
the complaints those interests have with the current regime are diverse. 
Overhauling the copyright statute took more than twenty years the last time 
Congress tried it, and there’s no reason to think it could happen more 
quickly today. These are not, moreover, the best of circumstances. The 
 
 12. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 48–63, 122–45. It’s commonplace that copyright rights 
keep expanding. U.S. copyright statutes are worse, doubling in size faster than healthcare or 
tuition costs. 
 13. See, e.g., Pam Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://btlj.org/data/articles/25_3/cpp. 
pdf (reporting conclusions of three-year project that invited a group of twenty copyright experts 
“to explore whether it was possible to reach some consensus about how current copyright law 
could be improved and how the law’s current problems could be mitigated”); A Special 
Conversation with Marybeth Peters, AUDIO ARCHIVE (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.archive.org/ 
details/FMCsummit07.petersconversation (describing unsuccessful negotiations among music 
and recording industry interests to reform 17 U.S.C. § 115). 
 14. See, e.g., Ted Johnson, Pols OK Bill on Royalties, VARIETY, May 14, 2009, 2009 WLNR 
9209693 (describing lobbying over bill to require radio broadcasters to pay performance 
royalties to the owners of sound recording copyrights); Wendy Davis, Entertainment Industry 
Pushes for Law Requiring Colleges To Filter Networks, MEDIAPOST (March 24, 2008), http:// 
publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.san&s=79058&Nid=40725&p=9187
39 (describing lobbying over bill to require colleges to block students’ peer-to-peer file 
sharing). 
 15. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Bertelsmann, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005) 
(seeking to expand the scope of secondary liability for copyright infringement); Brief for 
Americans for Tax Reform as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 15–17, Cartoon Network 
LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-1480-cv (L), 07-1511-cv 
(CON)) (arguing that momentary transient reproduction in computer’s RAM violates 
§ 106(1)); Brief for ASCAP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 17–19, Viacom Int’l v. 
YouTube, Inc., Nos. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS), 07 Civ. 3582 (LLS), 2010 WL 2532404 (S.D.N.Y. June 
23, 2010) (seeking a narrow construction of the scope of the Internet service provider safe 
harbors in 17 U.S.C. § 512); Brief for Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. as Amici Curiae at 14–20, 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-1497) 
(claiming that making a file available for distribution violates 106(3)); see generally LITMAN, 
supra note 2, at 24. 
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copyright bar, once a cozy sewing circle of plaintiffs’ lawyers,16 has grown 
intensely polarized over the past twenty years, and copyright discourse has 
become increasingly strident.17 That has nourished an atmosphere of 
profound distrust, which makes it harder to agree on terms. 
Interested parties have reason to be nervous about what might go 
wrong. Because major copyright legislation typically takes many iterations 
and many years between introduction and enactment, most copyright 
lawyers are, at least to some degree, experts in copyright legislative history. 
Students of past legislation know that in the course of any major copyright 
revision, new copyright-affected players have popped up and demanded that 
the law be reshaped to accommodate their needs. In the revision process 
that culminated in the enactment of the 1909 Copyright Act, for example, 
the manufacturers of phonographs and phonograph records nearly derailed 
the entire effort until they were satisfied with their treatment under the 
statute.18 Multiple attempts to modernize the copyright law during the 
1920s and 1930s foundered because new players ASCAP and radio 
broadcasters could not agree on anything.19 In the revision process that led 
to the 1976 Act, broadcast television, and then cable television, showed up 
and demanded special treatment; copyright revision ground to a halt until 
they got it.20 In the five-year effort that resulted in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act,21 telephone companies and Internet service providers were 
able to block the enactment of provisions sought by the entertainment and 
software industries until liability safe-harbor provisions for ISPs were added 
to the bill.22 
The prospect of upstart new copyright interests may be especially scary 
today because there are millions of ordinary people whose use of YouTube 
and peer-to-peer file-sharing networks gives them a direct, personal stake in 
the copyright law.23 Nobody has yet succeeded in mobilizing them into a 
 
 16. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright Unbound, in AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT, 
REPUBLISHED (AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS), at WEIN-1, WEIN-1 (Iris C. Geik et al. 
eds., 2005). 
 17. See Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 53 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 (2006). 
 18. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 39–40 and sources there cited. 
 19. See id. at 42–45. 
 20. See Litman, supra note 9, at 326–32 and sources there cited. 
 21. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 (1998) 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 108, 109, 112, 114, 512, 1301). 
 22. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 127–45 and sources there cited. During the same five-year 
period, composers, music publishers, and motion picture studios pursued an extension of 
copyright’s term from seventy-five (or life plus fifty) years to ninety-five (or life plus seventy) 
years. Bar and restaurant owners, angry at the cost of performing rights licenses, blocked term 
extension until proponents agreed to insert a bar and restaurant exemption into the term-
extension bill.  
 23. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated 
Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 845–46 (2009) (“Hundreds of millions of Internet 
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significant political force, but the majority of them are over eighteen, and 
many of them vote. It’s entirely possible that over the course of a multiyear, 
highly publicized copyright reform effort, the interests of ordinary voters 
could end up playing more than a nominal role.24 One can imagine 
circumstances in which a new awareness on the part of Congress that voters 
care about copyright could move the law pretty far from where current 
players would like to see it go. 
If I am right that a new cycle of copyright revision is beginning, though, 
it is only barely beginning. We are currently in the very early, pre-history 
stages of a revision effort. We are not yet locked in. We can still make 
choices about the premises and underlying assumptions that will form the 
basis of the next revision.25 
Much of my prior work has chronicled a depressing history of copyright 
legislation, in which copyright lobbyists engaged in protracted negotiations 
with one another to arrive at copyright laws that enriched established 
copyright industries at the expense of both creators and the general 
public.26 There’s ample reason to anticipate that the next copyright revision 
will proceed in similar fashion to similar ends. But what if it didn’t? What if 
we were able to take the opportunity to rethink our copyright system? What 
sort of copyright law might we craft instead? 
In Part I of this Article, I describe some of the problems the current 
copyright system poses for creators, for intermediaries, and for readers, 
listeners, and viewers. In Part II, I look at the copyright reform proposals 
drawing serious attention, and I argue that they fail to address the problems 
I described in Part I. I then, in Part III, suggest alternative goals for 
copyright reform, designed to enhance the copyright system’s effectiveness 
 
users are downloading, altering, mixing, uploading, and/or making available audio, video, and 
text content on personal web pages, social sites, or using peer-to-peer technology to allow 
others to access content on their computer.”). According to YouTube, “People are watching 2 
billion videos a day on YouTube and uploading hundreds of thousands of videos daily. In fact, 
every minute, 24 hours of video is uploaded to YouTube.” YouTube Fact Sheet, YOUTUBE, http:// 
www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). The Wall Street Journal reported in 
August 2009 that “YouTube has grown into a massive destination, with 428 million unique 
monthly visitors in June.” Jessica E. Vascellaro, YouTube Pumps More Ads into Lineup, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 20, 2009, at B1. 
 24. In June of 2009, Sweden’s Pirate Party, founded in 2006 with a platform of IP reform, 
captured enough votes to win a seat on the European Parliament. See Mats Lewan, Ahoy! Pirate 
Party Gets Berth in European Parliament, CNET (June 8, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1357 
8_3-10259048-38.html. In Canada, University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist had 
notable success using Facebook and his personal blog to organize opposition to Canadian 
copyright reform proposals. See MICHAEL GEIST BLOG, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/; Government 
Retreats on Copyright Reform, Dec. 13, 2007, CBC NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/ 
2007/12/13/tech-copyright-delay.html. 
 25. See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008); Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on 
Copyright Reform, 3 UTAH L. REV. 551 (2007). 
 26. See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 2. 
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and its legitimacy. I argue that wise copyright reform should simplify the law; 
should make the copyright system more useful for creators and for readers, 
listeners, and viewers; and should divest intermediaries of excess power and 
control. Those changes, I suggest, are necessary to enhance the law’s 
legitimacy. By that rubric, none of the current copyright reform proposals 
seem like a wise revision. In Part IV, I outline a few specific suggestions for 
changes that I believe would improve the copyright system’s value for both 
creators and their audiences. Finally, in Part V, I discuss whether there is a 
realistic possibility for copyright reform of the sort I described. I cannot 
currently envision a way to transform the premises of the copyright debate 
enough to make it likely that such changes would be enacted anytime soon. 
If we can manage, however, to encourage a broad conversation about 
copyright in which we’re willing to imagine unconventional solutions to 
copyright’s problems, we may discover that some changes are less impossible 
than we expect. 
I. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 
A copyright system is designed to produce an ecology that nurtures the 
creation, dissemination, and enjoyment of works of authorship.27 When it 
works well, it encourages creators to generate new works, assists 
intermediaries in disseminating them widely, and supports readers, listeners, 
and viewers in enjoying them.28 If the system poses difficult entry barriers to 
creators, imposes difficult impediments on intermediaries, or inflicts 
burdensome conditions and hurdles on readers, viewers, and listeners, then 
the system fails to achieve at least some of its purposes. The current U.S. 
copyright statute is flawed in all three respects. 
A. CREATORS’ COPYRIGHT 
Copyright laws, at least in theory, are designed to encourage the 
creation of new works of authorship by offering creators incentives in the 
 
 27. A note on terminology: In this article, unless I am referring to specific statutory 
categories, I use the word “creator” rather than “author,” “disseminate” rather than “distribute,” 
and “enjoy” rather than “use.” I do that primarily to avoid the baggage that “author,” 
“distribute,” and “use” have accumulated over the past few decades. By “creator,” I intend to 
name the individuals who make works of authorship, to the exclusion of the entities and 
employers who finance their work, whether or not those individuals are deemed “authors” in 
current or past copyright laws. By “disseminate,” I intend to encompass any means of making a 
work available to members of the public, whether or not that behavior is within the exclusive 
rights granted by copyright law. By “enjoy,” I mean reading, listening, viewing, playing, learning 
from, and any other use short of commercial exploitation, whether or not current law holds 
that such use requires a license. See also infra note 54. 
 28. See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified Theory of Copyright, 46 HOUS. L. 
REV. 215, 383 (2009) (copyright should serve “the public interest in the creation, transmission, 
and use of knowledge”). Patterson and Birch argue that while conventional copyright theory 
envisioned a bilateral relationship between author and user, it should instead be based on a 
tripartite relationship among author, publisher, and user. Id.  
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form of control. Those incentives are said to spur creators to author new 
works and make them available to the public, and to enable creators to earn 
income from the dissemination of their creations.29 The law’s congruence 
with the theory, at least in many fields of authorship, is more aspirational 
than real.30 
Creators face demoralizing obstacles in searching for opportunities to 
write, paint, play, or film anything the public will see or hear.31 The chance 
to reach an audience has been turned into a tantalizing grand prize for 
aspiring musicians,32 filmmakers,33 actors,34 painters,35 sculptors,36 and 
photographers,37 who are willing to endure the indignities of reality 
television in the hope of scoring an apprenticeship, patron, or entry-level 
job creating works of authorship. Even when creators succeed in publishing 
a book, cutting an album, placing an article, or selling a screenplay, 
moreover, they typically earn only a small share of the proceeds of the 
copyrights in their works. In most creative spheres, authors’ control over 
their works is short-lived, and the earnings they collect from them are 
 
 29. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 7 (1994); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1613 (2001). As Diane Zimmerman has recently reminded us, the 
soundness of the basic copyright incentive theory is, so far, merely theoretical. See Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515964. 
 30. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 117–19 (2009). 
 31. See, e.g., TODD LONDON ET AL., OUTRAGEOUS FORTUNE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE 
NEW AMERICAN PLAY 2 (2009) (Theatre Development Fund study finding a “system of theatrical 
production that has become increasingly alienating to individual artists and inhospitable to the 
cultivation of new work for the stage”); Michael Cieply, Films Finding a Tougher Market in Toronto, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, at C1 (reporting that the vast majority of independent films shown 
at the 2009 Toronto film festival failed to find an American distributor); Jon Pareles, 1,700 
Bands, Rocking as the CD Industry Reels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at A1 (“There’s never a 
shortage of eager musicians. Many bands drive cross-country by van or cross an ocean to 
perform an unpaid showcase at South By Southwest, and the most determined ones play not 
only their one festival slot but also half a dozen peripheral parties as well, hoping to be 
noticed.”); BEFORE THE MUSIC DIES (B-Side Entertainment 2006) (documentary film about the 
music and recording industries).  
 32. See, e.g., American Idol (FOX television series 2002–2010); see also Pareles, supra note 
31. 
 33. See, e.g., On the Lot (FOX television series 2007); Project Greenlight (HBO 2001–2005). 
 34. See, e.g., Grease: You’re the One that I Want (NBC television series 2007); High School 
Musical: Get in the Picture (ABC 2008); Legally Blond the Musical: The Search for Elle Woods (MTV 
television series 2008). 
 35. See Randy Kennedy, When Art Meets TV, Realism Might Not Make It to Reality, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 20, 2009, at C1 (hundreds of painters audition for new reality show to discover unknown 
visual artists). 
 36. See Work of Art: The Next Great Artist (BRAVO television series 2010). 
 37. See The Shot (VHI television series 2007) (reality show competition among still 
photographers for “$100,000, the chance to shoot a fashion spread for Marie Claire magazine, 
and have their shot on the cover of a Victoria Secret catalog”). 
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modest.38 The control of their works and the bulk of the proceeds they earn 
are held instead by copyright owners who serve as intermediaries between 
the authors and their audiences.39 
Only a few creators get rich from copyright royalties. A somewhat larger 
number are able to make a living from creating works of authorship, but the 
majority of creators need day jobs to supplement their income.40 The 
academy is full of poets, novelists, painters, composers, and performers who 
teach; the waiter who brought your meal the last time you dined in New 
York or Los Angeles is most likely there awaiting his or her next audition. 
Why is authorship so unremunerative? It isn’t that people don’t value 
works of authorship enough to spend money for them. Studies of the 
economic contribution made by copyright industries to the U.S. economy 
report that they generate more than a trillion dollars annually.41 Very few of 
those dollars, however, end up in creators’ pockets. The copyright statute 
incorporates a decided bias in favor of distributors. That bias comes 
primarily at creators’ expense. Although U.S. copyright law vests copyright as 
an initial matter in authors’ hands, the creator is not necessarily the author 
as a legal matter. All works created by employees within the scope of their 
employment and many works created by independent contractors are 
deemed to have been authored by the employer or commissioner as a 
matter of law.42 For other works, the creator is the author and owns the 
 
 38. See, e.g., DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 68–
98, 386–91, 398–404 (5th ed. 2003); Herman Finkelstein, The Copyright Law—A Reappraisal, 
104 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1051 (1956); BEFORE THE MUSIC DIES, supra note 31. 
 39. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 (1967); PATRY, supra 
note 30, at 117; Graeme W. Austin, Keynote Address, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 397 (2004). 
 40. See LONDON ET AL., supra note 31, at 50–80 (reporting that even successful playwrights 
cannot make a living from their plays); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Musicians, Singers and 
Related Workers, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010-11 EDITION, http://www.bls.gov/ 
oco/pdf/ocos095.pdf (“Part-time schedules—typically at night and on weekends—intermittent 
unemployment, and rejection when auditioning for work are common; many musicians and 
singers supplement their income with earnings from other sources.”); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, Artists and Related Workers, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010-11 EDITION, 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos092.htm (“Actors endure long periods of unemployment, intense 
competition for roles, and frequent rejections in auditions. . . . Because earnings may be erratic, 
many actors, producers, and directors supplement their incomes by holding jobs in other 
fields.”). For other examples, see Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 9–10. 
 41. See, e.g., THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: 
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE 8 (2010), http://www.ccianet. 
org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000354/fair-use-study-final.pdf (“In 2007, 
fair use industries generated revenue of $4.7 trillion, a 36 percent increase over 2002 revenue 
of $3.4 trillion.”); STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2003–
2007 REPORT 3 (June 2009), http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPASiwekReport2003-07.pdf (“By 
2007 . . . the value added to the U.S. GDP by the ‘total’ copyright industries rose to $1.52 
trillion . . . or 11.05% of U.S. GDP.”).  
 42. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2006). The United States is one of a small number of 
countries to have a work made for hire doctrine, and even among countries that deem 
employers to be authors of some works, the scope of the U.S. doctrine is unusually broad.  
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copyright as an initial matter, but the copyright system encourages the 
author to assign her copyright to a distributor in exchange for 
exploitation.43 Once the author transfers her copyright, the law does not 
make it easy for her to retrieve it. Although the statute contains a 
mechanism intended to allow authors to reclaim copyrights after 35, 40, 56, 
or 75 years,44 the mechanism was designed to make it extremely difficult to 
do so.45 Meanwhile, creators of some works cannot as a practical matter 
navigate the system as individuals. The statutory compulsory licenses, for 
example, contemplate that claimants to a share of statutory license fees will 
be represented by corporate or collective entities; those entities operate on 
the assumption that copyrights have been assigned to distributor 
intermediaries.46 
Some people point out that authors have very little bargaining power as 
compared with publishers,47 but that isn’t inherent in the natural order. 
Rather, it reflects the fact that the American copyright law tilts, and has 
always tilted, the playing field in distributors’ favor. The disparity of 
bargaining power is at least partly an artifact of the way the copyright law 
works.48 The copyright statute has favored publishers, record labels, motion 
picture studios, and other distributors because Congress has, for the past 
century, encouraged lawyers for publishers, record labels, motion picture 
 
 43. The law makes copyright assignment easy. See id. § 204. Once the copyright is assigned, 
the new copyright owner stands in the shoes of the original author, and will be entitled to 
exercise almost all copyright rights, including the right to sue the original creator for copyright 
infringement. See, e.g., Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
 44. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (thirty-five or forty years after grant); id. § 304(c)(3) (fifty-
six years after copyright first secured); id. § 304(d)(2) (seventy-five years after copyright first 
secured only if the § 304(c) termination opportunity was foregone). 
 45. See generally Howard Abrams, Who’s Sorry Now? Termination Rights and the Derivative Work 
Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181 (1985); Allison M. Scott, Note, Oh Bother: Milne, Steinbeck, 
and an Emerging Circuit Split over the Alienability of Copyright Termination Rights, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 357 (2007). See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text. 
 46. See COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BD., LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/crb/ (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2010); SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Sept. 17, 
2010). 
 47. See, e.g., Gabe Bloch, Note, Transformation in Publishing: Modeling the Effect of New Media, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647 (2005). Creators in some industries have additional clout as a 
consequence of unionization and collective bargaining, but must usually give up their 
copyrights as a condition of employment.  
 48. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573 (2010). Recent court rulings reading the copyright statute to 
require copyright owner permission for even tiny uses of expression from copyrighted works, 
see, for example, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), have 
exacerbated the problem. If creators must seek myriad licenses from multiple sources before 
releasing their works to the public, they will need to rely on the licensing resources of a major 
distributor. See Copyright Criminals: This Is a Sampling Sport (PBS television broadcast Jan. 19, 
2010), available at http://www.copyrightcriminals.com/. An additional factor in the disparity is 
the large capital investment once required to engage in mass distribution of an author’s works. 
See infra text accompanying note 49. 
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studios, and other distributors to write themselves a law that worked for 
them.49 What worked for them was a system that reposed power in copyright 
owners and made it easiest for distributors to end up owning the copyrights. 
A law favoring distributors at creators’ expense made more practical 
sense in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than it does in the twenty-
first. Until recently, mass distribution of copies of works of authorship 
required large capital investment. Paper, printing presses, broadcast towers, 
motion picture and video cameras, stores, trucks, and the other incidents of 
mass distribution networks are very expensive. Before digital networks, it was 
entirely reasonable to assume that only if distributors could rely on 
collecting the largest share of proceeds from copyrighted works would the 
business of mass distribution seem likely to reward their investment.50 
Today, of course, there are many ways of disseminating works to everyone in 
the world without having to spend much money. One implication is that 
individuals can transmit copies of works to one another at insignificant 
expense. That is the one that’s received all the attention, as copyright 
owners indulge in panic over unlicensed dissemination.51 A second 
implication strikes me as more interesting: the new economics of digital 
distribution mean that we no longer need to shape our copyright law in ways 
that disadvantage creators vis-à-vis distributors unless we want to. 
 
 49. See generally LITMAN, supra note 2. This isn’t a recent phenomenon. Anglo-American 
copyright law originated as a law by and for printers and publishers and has always been 
distributor-centric. See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 1–37; LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 42–178 (1968); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION 
OF COPYRIGHT 10–66 (1993). 
 50. See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 5–9, 75–78. 
 51. See, e.g., An Update: Piracy on University Networks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6–8 (2007) 
[hereinafter An Update: Piracy on University Networks], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/printers/110th/33812.PDF (testimony of Cary Sherman, President, Recording 
Industry Association of America (“RIAA”)) (complaining that universities have failed to stop 
“piracy where it is most rampant”); id. at 75–77 (letter from Dan Glickman, Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”)) (attributing forty-
four percent of the film industry’s domestic losses to college students); Protecting Copyright and 
Innovation in a Post-Grokster World: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16–
17 (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_ 
senate_hearings&docid=f:34113.pdf (testimony of Marty Roe, Recording Artist, Arista Records) 
(stating that peer-to-peer businesses have forced musicians and songwriters to abandon their 
music careers); id. at 18 (testimony of Cary Sherman) (stating that peer-to-peer is the reason 
that “[t]housands of individuals engaged in the music, film and other entertainment industries 
have seen their jobs disappear”); INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES’ 
GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOR 2009, http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPA2009GlobalChallenges.pdf 
(“Internet piracy, from infringing websites, top site pre-release groups, to unauthorized [peer-
to-peer] file sharing, has undergone explosive growth, hindering legitimate electronic 
commerce opportunities and causing mounting losses to the music, movie, videogame, business 
software and publishing industries.”). 
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B. READERS’ COPYRIGHT 
If creators are the natural subject of copyright, readers, listeners, and 
viewers are its purpose. The most important reason we encourage creators to 
make, and distributors to disseminate, works of authorship is so that people 
will read the books, listen to the music, look at the art, and watch the 
movies.52 We want readers, listeners, and viewers to enjoy the works, learn 
from them, interact with them, and communicate with one another about 
them. That is the way that copyright law promotes the Progress of Science.53 
In practical terms, that means we need to make sure there’s enough 
freedom built into the law to ensure that copyright doesn’t get in the way of 
reading, viewing, and listening. 
Readers, listeners, and viewers54 have, until recently, been the 
beneficiaries of a law designed to allow most people to enjoy copyrighted 
works without worrying about the copyright law. For most of copyright law’s 
history, it has applied narrowly, directly affecting only individuals and 
businesses for whom copyright was a central concern. By granting copyright 
owners control over specified, defined uses and leaving other uses 
unconstrained, copyright law gave readers, listeners, and viewers 
considerable freedom to enjoy copyrighted works.55 Copyright law protected 
only a small number of works, conferring narrow rights for relatively short 
periods of time. The limited scope of copyright left large free spaces that 
permitted readers, listeners, and viewers to enjoy copyrighted works as they 
wanted to without attention to what the copyright law said. There weren’t 
many express user rights in the statute; there didn’t need to be. Congress or 
the courts stepped in to add express user rights only in instances in which 
copyright owners overreached the boundaries of their rights by filing suit 
 
 52. See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 75–76; L. Ray Patterson, Fair Use for Teaching and Research: 
The Folly of Kinko’s and Texaco, in GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR LIBRARIES, 
EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY 351, 356–63 (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997). 
 53. E.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). See generally 
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149 (1998). 
 54. The literature discussing the public’s interest in copyright is struggling with the issue 
of just what should we call the folks who read, listen to, look at, watch, play, run, and build 
works of authorship. Popular choices include “users,” see Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in 
Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005); Patterson & Birch, supra note 28, “consumers,” 
see Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119 
(2007); Joseph Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003), and 
“fans,” see Fred Von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea?, LAW.COM (Sept. 29, 2004), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1095434496352. See also Justin Hughes, “Recoding” 
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999) (“non-owners”). 
In this Article, I call individuals enjoying copyrighted works “readers” or “readers, listeners, and 
viewers.” 
 55. See KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 25–36; Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1871 (2007). 
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over reasonable-seeming practices.56 The basic architecture of the system 
respected the rights of readers, listeners, and viewers by limiting the reach of 
copyright rights, rather than by setting out the scope of individual audience 
interests in explicit terms. 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the idea that 
copyright law constrained how readers may read books, how listeners may 
listen to music, or how viewers could watch television programming would 
have been seen as a radical expansion.57 As technology has enabled 
individuals to enjoy works in new ways, however, copyright owners have 
asked for greatly enhanced control over their works. Copyright owners have 
insisted to Congress and the courts that, because copyrights are their 
property, nobody should be allowed to make a valuable use of a copyrighted 
work without paying the copyright owner.58 Those arguments have fueled 
both statutory and non-statutory expansions in the scope of copyright 
rights.59 After persuading Congress to enact a statute prohibiting anyone 
from circumventing technological protections that prevent unauthorized 
access or use,60 copyright owners have distributed copies of works in 
incompatible formats, and insisted that purchasers of those copies have and 
 
 56. The statute’s express user exemptions provisions are idiosyncratic, and most of them 
trace their origin from ill-considered lawsuits. Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (allowing 
resale of lawfully made copies), id. § 109(c) (permitting people to play videogames in public 
places), id. § 110(5)(A) (permitting people to play radio and television broadcasts in public 
places), and id. § 110(11) (permitting in-home use of censorware to block the sexual or violent 
scenes in movies released on DVDs), with Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151 (1975) (rejecting infringement claim for playing radio in small restaurant), Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (rejecting infringement claim for discount book resale), Red 
Baron-Franklin Park Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F. 2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding arcade liable 
for public performance of videogames), and Cleanflicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. 
Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (enjoining commercial entities from editing commercially 
released DVDs to remove sexual or violent content). 
 57. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 932–42 (2005); L. 
Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry into a Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair 
Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385 (1992). 
 58. See, e.g., The Performance Rights Act and Parity Among Music Delivery Platforms: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 9–11 (2009) [hereinafter The Performance Rights 
Act], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_ 
hearings&docid=f:54557.pdf (testimony of Marian Leighton-Levy, Founder and Owner, 
Rounder Records); see also id. at 14 (testimony of Ralph Oman, Lecturer, George Washington 
University, and former Register of Copyrights) (“It comes down to this, . . . [a]s a matter of 
property rights, men and women who create and own a copyrighted work should have the right 
to get paid for it by the people who use their works. That is the basic premise of copyright 
protection.”). 
 59. Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 593–96 (2008). 
 60. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1204); RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control 
Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
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should have no legitimate claim to be able to bypass technological locks.61 
Readers, listeners, and viewers today face inconvenience and inflated prices, 
and a future in which businesses roll out more maddeningly incompatible 
formats.62 Meanwhile, enhanced copyright-owner control has squeezed 
reader, listener, and viewer freedom to enjoy works in ways that depart from 
the copyright owners’ menu. If an important purpose of copyright law is to 
encourage reading, listening, and viewing, a law that makes those acts less 
likely is counterproductive.63 If the copyright system is designed in a way 
that significantly impairs the reading, listening, and viewing of copyrighted 
works, then it will fail to accomplish one of its core goals. 
Copyright laws that make reading, listening, and viewing more difficult 
are problematic for a second reason: the sheer pointlessness of some of 
these restraints has undermined the perceived legitimacy of the U.S. 
copyright system.64 Copyright law’s legitimacy has suffered marked erosion 
 
 61. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n, RM 2008-8, Reply Comments (Feb. 2, 2009), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/dvd-cca-inc-38.pdf; Motion 
Picture Ass’n of Am., RM 2008-8, Comments (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.copyright. 
gov/1201/2008/responses/mpaa-46.pdf; Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n, RM 2008-8, Reply 
Comments (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/ 
software-information-industry-assoc-17.pdf.  
 62. See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL 
CULTURE 267–81 (2007); Nate Anderson, DRM Still Sucks: Yahoo Music Going Dark, Taking Keys 
with It, ARS TECHNICA (July 24, 2008, 3:00 PM) http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/2008 
0724-drm-still-sucks-yahoo-music-going-dark-taking-keys-with-it.html; Cory Doctorow, How To 
Destroy the Book, Speech Before the National Reading Summit (Nov. 13, 2009), in THE 
VARSITY, Dec. 14, 2009, available at http://thevarsity.ca/articles/23855. There are other 
problems with current DRM regimes: some of them give publishers more control over 
purchased content than consumers have any reason to expect. In July of 2009, for example, 
Amazon.com resolved a copyright dispute with the publisher of George Orwell’s Animal Farm 
and 1984, by automatically deleting purchased copies of both e-books from purchaser’s Kindle 
e-book readers, and crediting their accounts for a “return.” See David Pogue, Pogue’s Posts: Some 
E-Books Are More Equal than Others, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009, 12:57 PM), http://pogue.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2009/07/17/some-e-books-are-more-equal-than-others/. See generally Updated and 
Corrected: E-Books Buyer’s Guide to Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.eff. 
org/deeplinks/2010/01/updated-and-corrected-e-book-buyers-guide-privacy (summarizing 
privacy-related policies of popular e-book readers). 
 63. See GILLESPIE, supra note 62, at 273–79; John A. Rothchild, The Social Costs of 
Technological Protection Measures, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1181, 1198–1205 (2007). 
 64. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 30, at 161–70 (criticizing copyright industries’ misuse of 
anticircumvention provisions of DMCA); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right To Claim Authorship in U.S. 
Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 264 (2004) (“If you inquired among the 
general public, ‘What does U.S. copyright law protect?’ many people might start by grumbling 
that it overprotects piggish record companies.”); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 548–49 (arguing that more sophisticated 
copyright enforcement has forced us to confront the “vast disparity between what activities the 
Copyright Act proscribes and what the average American might consider fair or just”). 
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in the public’s view.65 That damage is an independent threat to the health of 
the copyright system. 
The current copyright system’s disservice to readers, listeners, and 
viewers, however, goes beyond simply impeding their enjoyment of works by 
encouraging copyright owners to deploy annoying mechanisms to track, 
trace, meter, monetize, and restrict it. More fundamentally, it ignores or 
devalues the creativity that readers bring to the works they enjoy. Reading, 
listening, and viewing have never been acts of purely passive absorption; they 
have always entailed meaningful creativity and imagination.66 The 
widespread deployment of digital technology now allows readers, listeners, 
and viewers to express their creative readings in fixed form and share them 
with the world. They have flooded the Internet with the digital, online 
instantiation of the same creative impulses that readers, listeners, and 
viewers have expressed since before the invention of copyright.67 Most of 
this creative activity has been neither exploitative nor commercial.68 It has 
seemed to enhance rather than detract from copyrighted works’ success. 
Indeed, by serving as a focus for communities of fans, it has tended to stoke 
demand.69 Most copyright owners have therefore been loath to condemn it. 
The copyright system views this activity as presumptively illegal, if commonly 
“tolerated.”70 Rather than sheltering it under a privilege or exemption, or 
drawing careful lines to divide the legal from the illegal, the law simply 
pretends that it isn’t there. (Unless of course, the copyright owner deigns to 
object to it, at which point it needs to disappear for real.)71 A system that 
treats creative activity in which readers, listeners, and viewers engage every 
day as a “tolerated use,” ignored rather than promoted or permitted, is not a 
system designed to encourage the creative enjoyment of copyrighted works. 
If readers, listeners, and viewers see this law as neither sensible nor 
reasonable, who could blame them? 
 
 65. Accord PATRY, supra note 30, at xx–xxiv; Paul Edward Gellar, Beyond the Copyright Crisis: 
Principles for Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 165, 175 (2008); Jane C. Ginsburg, How 
Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 63–67 (2002); see also MARK 
HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM, at xiii (2009) (“[I]ntellectual property rights do not anymore 
enjoy the presumption either that they are justified or that they will endure.”). 
 66. See Jessica Litman, Creative Reading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 175, 
175–80. 
 67. See Sara K. Stadler, Performance Values, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 697, 727–28 (2008). 
 68. See generally, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural 
Creativity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 135. 
 69. See Litman, supra note 66, at 175–80. 
 70. See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008) (defining “tolerated 
use” as “infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright owner may be aware, yet 
does nothing about”). 
 71. See Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(enjoining publication of Harry Potter Lexicon); Cease and Desist Notices: Fan Fiction, CHILLING 
EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/notice.cgi (last visited Sept. 17, 
2010) (archive of cease and desist letters objecting to fan sites). 
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The widespread perception of the current copyright system as 
illegitimate should be unsurprising. In significant part, it flows from 
copyright owners’ assertions that, as established copyright players, they 
should be entitled to prescribe the rules for new entrants. Throughout 
copyright history, entrenched players have sought to hold new players to 
copyright rules written by and for established groups; the new players have 
challenged the legitimacy of that move, and by and large have succeeded in 
persuading Congress to enact new rules crafted to meet their needs.72 In the 
early twentieth century, music publishers tried to bind piano roll makers to 
the rules they had set up with music printers; dramatists and novelists tried 
to force motion picture producers to follow the rules they had worked out 
with theatrical producers. In the 1920s, composers sought to require 
business establishments with radios to license music as if they were mounting 
live performances; in the 1930s, composers and music publishers made the 
same demands on motion picture theaters showing talkies. In the 1970s, 
copyright owners and broadcast television stations insisted that cable 
television operators should need to license every signal they transmitted on 
the same terms as broadcast television; in the 1980s, they made comparable 
demands of satellite-TV companies. In the 1990s, copyright owners insisted 
that Internet service providers should seek permission for every computer 
copy of any work on the same basis that publishers and record labels were 
required to license printed books and records. In every case, the businesses 
exploiting the new medium successfully insisted that the new technology 
required new, medium-specific rules.73 Today, book publishers, record 
labels, and motion picture studios maintain that the laws they agreed on 
among themselves to govern their interactions with one another are the 
rules that should apply to all the ordinary readers, listeners, and viewers in 
their audiences.74 Why should the public agree that these rules are either 
fair or wise? 
Indeed, the dangers of this particular legitimacy crisis may be more 
significant than attacks by earlier outsider groups, because a public citizenry 
that believes its copyright law is illegitimate may respond by withdrawing its 
support from the system. The public, after all, invests in the copyright system 
both by granting rights to copyright owners through the enactment of 
copyright laws, and by complying with the laws its Congress enacts.75 If the 
public perceives copyright law to give it a poor return on its investment, it 
may well respond by divesting—either pressing its elected representatives to 
enact additional limitations and privileges, or simply failing to comply with 
 
 72. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 39–41, 47–48, 58–62, 122–45.  
 73. See id. at 39–47, 58–60, 127–36.  
 74. See id. at 114–17. 
 75. See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Rule of Intellectual Property Law in the Internet Economy, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 1073, 1076–79 (2008). Reidenberg deploys this insight to argue that copyright 
disobedience is a frontal challenge to the rule of law. Id. 
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rules it no longer perceives as legitimate. Millions of citizens have used 
unlicensed peer-to-peer file-sharing applications to share music with each 
other, even though they faced a highly publicized risk of being sued for 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Many, perhaps most, of them don’t 
believe they’re doing anything wrong. Enforcing copyright law in an 
atmosphere of public cynicism about the legitimacy of the law is a difficult 
task. A public that complies with copyright only because it’s afraid of the 
copyright police will soon find ways to evade or restrain the copyright police. 
The long-term health of the copyright system, thus, requires that members 
of the public believe that their investment in copyright is well spent. 
C. INTERMEDIARIES’ COPYRIGHT 
The copyright system has traditionally relied on two different sorts of 
intermediaries whose motivation to further the goals of copyright is 
primarily economic. Distributors commonly make and distribute copies of 
works of authorship and authorize other uses. Under the legacy system we 
have inherited, distributors own the copyrights; they license reproduction, 
adaptation, and public distribution, performance, and display. Other 
intermediaries, whom I term “makers,” invent and market devices and 
services for enjoying works of authorship, without themselves engaging in 
licensed uses. The relationship between distributors and makers has been 
contested for much of copyright’s history. 
1. Distributors 
Under the conventional law-and-economics view of copyright, 
distributors are essential.76 By creating a market for copyrighted works, they 
both provide the money that acts as an incentive for creators to make new 
works, and move copies or performances of those works to where readers, 
listeners, and viewers can enjoy them.77 As the entities who buy copyrights 
from creators, these intermediaries claim to stand in the shoes of the 
audience for the works;78 as the interests who sell copies and performances 
 
 76. See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 4–20 (1989); 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1907–16 (1990); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. 
Supp. 1, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that “copyright protection is essential to finance the 
publications that distribute” scientific articles, even though authors are not paid for them), 
aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 77. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209 (1983); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 
(1982). 
 78. See, e.g., Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 75–88 (2005) [hereinafter Music Licensing Reform], available 
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f: 
22919.pdf (testimony of Rob Glaser, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, RealNetworks, 
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to individual readers, viewers, and listeners, they claim to stand in the shoes 
of creators and collect rents on their behalf.79 Of course, distributors don’t 
enter into the copyright marketplace solely to promote the “Progress of 
Science;”80 their participation in the copyright system is fueled primarily by 
self-interest. 
Distributors find a lot to complain about in their current position in the 
copyright system. Although distributors were primarily responsible for the 
design of the current statute, they are discovering that they failed to 
anticipate and solve many of the problems that its architecture poses in the 
networked digital environment. Part of distributors’ difficulty—the part that 
has garnered the most attention—stems from the challenges posed by digital 
distribution. The ease of unlicensed digital dissemination threatens the 
model underlying most distributors’ businesses.81 
A different but equally pressing set of problems derives from the 
tangled snarls attending licensing of copyrighted works.82 The law is 
hospitable for large and well-established players pursuing traditional 
business models.83 So long as a distributor is an established large copyright 
player determined to continue to do whatever brought it success in the past, 
the current U.S. copyright law is its friend. Control of a large repertoire of 
 
Inc., for Digital Media Association); id. at 63–74 (testimony of Ismael Cuebas, Director of 
Merchandising Operations, TransWorld Entertainment Corp., for National Association of 
Recording Merchandisers). 
 79. See, e.g., id. at 145–48 (testimony of Irwin Z. Robinson, Chairman and Chief 
Exececutive Officer, Famous Music Publishing, for National Music Publishers Association). 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts . . . .”). 
 81. See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Essay: From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development 
of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 113 (2003). 
 82. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78, at 41–48 (testimony of Glen Barros, President 
and Chief Executive Officer, Concord Music Group); id. at 75–78 (testimony of Rob Glaser).  
 83. Lobbyists for copyright-owning businesses have succeeded in persuading Congress to 
enact copyright laws that allocate much of the benefit of copyright to intermediaries, and that 
incorporate powerful benefits for incumbents. This advantage comes in two basic flavors. First, 
when Congress enacts the rules surrounding a new right, license, or exception, it defines it in 
narrow terms that fit the current practice of the incumbents who negotiated the statutory 
provision but are not useful for outsiders. The exception in § 117(c) allowing computer 
maintenance and repair services to turn on computers for the sole purpose of maintaining or 
repairing them was drafted with sufficient narrowness to make it unavailable to people who wish 
to turn on their computers for other purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006). Second, 
Congress commonly gives copyright goodies to the incumbents who request them. Thus, when 
Congress in 1998 extended copyright terms by twenty years, it vested the extended term in 
current copyright proprietors rather than authors, subject to a narrow and difficult to exercise 
termination right for a limited class of authors who had not previously sought to recapture their 
copyrights. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 
Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The termination 
provisions, like those for the 1976 extension of the copyright term, make it more difficult to 
reassign rights under a terminated copyright grant to anyone other than the original grantee. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(C)–(D). 
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copyrighted works or of large media outlets combined with economies of 
scale in licensing transactions enable established players to license 
conventional uses with only modest difficulty. A creator or distributor 
seeking to exploit works in new media, though, faces daunting problems in 
identifying the rightsholders entitled to license its uses and negotiating the 
terms of the licenses.84 Even established industry groups have complained 
that the licensing provisions of the current law are simply unworkable for 
newer uses.85 Innovations like copyright divisibility,86 which seemed like a 
good idea at the time,87 have vastly complicated the licensing of copyrighted 
works by subjecting would-be licensees to multiple and sometimes 
inconsistent demands.88 Small businesses that want to pay reasonable 
royalties for the opportunity to exploit works in new markets can face 
insuperable difficulties in arranging to do so.89 Failing to cross all the t’s and 
dot the right i’s, even with the assistance of counsel, is a good way to find 
your business sued into bankruptcy.90 
Some erosion in the position of distributors under copyright is probably 
both natural and desirable. As expensive methods of distribution yield to 
 
 84. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78; Editorial, Orphan Works, D-LIB MAGAZINE, 
June 2006, available at http://www.dlib.org/dlib/june06/06editorial.html; Anonymous, 
Showstopper, QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG (Jan. 5, 2010, 23:49), http://questioncopyright.org/ 
showstopper. 
 85. See, e.g., Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) 
[hereinafter Section 115 of the Copyright Act]; Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts: Balancing the 
Interests of Sound Recording Copyright Owners with Those of Broadcasters: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 22–37 
(2004) (testimony of Dan Halyburton, Senior Vice President/General Manager of Group 
Operations, Susquehanna Radio Corp., on behalf of the National Association of Broadcasters) 
[hereinafter Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts]. 
 86. Under 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2), any subset of copyright rights may be transferred and 
owned separately. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2). The law does not require the owner of a copyright or 
any portion of a copyright to register her claim, and registration of transfers of parts of a 
copyright are rare. That makes it difficult for entities seeking to negotiate a license to 
determine the identity of the appropriate licensor.  
 87. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 123 (1976) (“[Divisibility] has long been sought by 
authors and their representatives, and . . . has attracted wide support from other groups . . . .”). 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 
2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 547, 565–74 (1997); Jessica Litman, Sharing & Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 18–23 (2005); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 673, 689–702 (2003); Stadler, supra note, 67, at 732. 
 89. See, e.g., Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831 (W.D. Pa. 
2000); Non-waiver of Rights, SOUNDEXCHANGE (Nov. 5, 2009), http://soundexchange.com/?s= 
non+waiver+of+rights. 
 90. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlayTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2004); 
Copyright.net Music Publ’g LLC v. MP3.com, 256 F. Supp. 2d 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); John 
Borland, iCraveTV.com’s Exec Discusses His Start-up’s Short Life, CNET (Feb. 29, 2000), http:// 
news.cnet.com/2100-1033-237450.html. 
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inexpensive alternatives, the justification for giving distributors the lion’s 
share of the copyright fades.91 Where the design of the statute introduces 
unnecessary uncertainty, expense, and obstacles into distribution, though, 
it’s simply wasteful. 
2. Makers 
I haven’t yet spoken to the interests of a second sort of intermediary, 
which, historically, has found copyright law to cause significant problems. 
This is the group of people and businesses who make instruments, devices, 
and services designed for the enjoyment of copyrighted works. This category 
comprises trumpets, pianos, violins, radios, televisions, tape recorders, 
computers, DVD players, e-book readers, and iPods. The people who make 
trumpets are in the business of making money, sometimes lots of money, 
from music written by other people. Indeed, their entire business model 
depends on the commercial exploitation of other people’s music. In 
general, instrument makers profit commercially by taking advantage of 
readers’, listeners’, and players’ desires to enjoy works created by others. 
For most of its history, the copyright law ignored instrument makers. 
After all, making and selling a trumpet, or a radio, or a digital video 
recorder does not necessarily involve any copying, adaptation, public 
performance, or public distribution of works of authorship. But a business 
that makes and sells instruments might make a pot of money because of the 
demand produced by the creators of copyrighted works. And that money 
attracted the attention of copyright owners. Where attention lands, litigation 
often follows. The history of copyright law reflects repeated efforts by 
copyright owners to bring the manufacture of devices and the sale of services 
for enjoying copyrighted works within copyright owners’ control. Some of 
those efforts failed; others succeeded. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, music publishers filed 
unsuccessful copyright infringement suits against the manufacturers of 
player pianos and piano rolls.92 Rebuffed by the courts, music publishers 
persuaded Congress to extend copyright in 1909 to encompass control of 
“parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical 
work.”93 
When radio broadcasts became common, copyright owners sought to 
enjoin broadcasters from unlicensed broadcast of the works, and 
 
 91. I am indebted to Michael Carroll for this insight. See Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is 
It Anyway?: How We Came To View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 
1494–95 (2003). 
 92. See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Kennedy v. 
McTammany, 33 F. 584 (D. Mass. 1888); see also Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901) 
(holding that it is not copyright infringement to make and sell wax cylinders for phonographs).  
 93. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–76 (current version at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–1205 (2006)). 
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establishments from unlicensed use of radios on their premises. The lawsuits 
generated a confusing array of conflicting decisions.94 When courts 
assimilated either the radio broadcast or the use of a radio on commercial 
premises to a live musical performance, they held for the music publisher;95 
when, instead, they assimilated it to a device or service assisting the listener, 
they held it non-infringing.96 
The notion that instrument makers should be held legally responsible 
for deriving a parasitic benefit from copyrighted works gained traction in 
the mid-twentieth century with the ubiquity of jukeboxes.97 Under the 1909 
Copyright Act, unlicensed public performances of music using jukeboxes 
were exempt from copyright liability.98 Copyright owners insisted that the 
exemption promoted “legalized piracy of music by jukeboxes,”99 and urged 
Congress to close the loophole. A sponsor of an unsuccessful 1959 bill 
seeking to remove the statutory jukebox exemption explained: “The basic 
theory behind this legislation is that everybody who makes a profit from the 
use of musical or literary property should pay his fair share.”100 Despite the 
Copyright Office’s support, that jukebox bill and others like it failed to 
overcome political opposition.101 
In 1976, motion picture studios relied on the same basic theory in filing 
suit against Sony for marketing the Betamax home video recorder.102 The 
studios argued that Sony’s Betamax machines enabled individual consumers 
 
 94. See Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 
298 F. 628 (S.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925); M. Witmark & Sons v. 
Bamberger Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923). Early radio broadcaster defendants were often 
manufacturers or sellers of radio receiving sets who operated broadcast stations to promote the 
sale of their radios. See, e.g., Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 298 F. at 629.  
 95. Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Gen. Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829. 
 96. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734; Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929), rev’d sub nom. 
Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191; see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151 (1975); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
 97. See generally Authorizing Royalties for Musical Compositions on Coin-Operated Machines: 
Hearing on H.R. 5921 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. (1959) 
[hereinafter Authorizing Royalties]. 
 98. See Act of Mar. 4, § 1(e). See generally Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 337, 350–54 (2002).  
 99. Authorizing Royalties, supra note 97, at 3. 
 100. Id. at 6 (remarks of Rep. Emanuel Celler).  
 101. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6: 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE 
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 59–61 (1965). The jukebox exemption remained in 
the law until 1976, when it was replaced by a lightly enforced compulsory license at a nominal 
$8 annual rate. Congress replaced the compulsory license with a voluntary blanket license in 
1989 when it ratified the Berne Convention. See 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2006). 
 102. See generally JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT 
CAUSED (2002). 
LITMAN_PDF.DOC 10/28/2010  1:48 PM 
2010] REAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 23 
to copy the studios’ television programs without the studios’ consent. Any 
unlicensed copy, they argued, infringed their copyrights. Because it made 
and sold machines designed to make those copies, Sony should be held 
liable.103 The United States Supreme Court rejected the theory: 
 One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the 
elected representatives of the millions of people who watch 
television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for 
later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against 
the sale of machines that make such copying possible.104 
In 1991, however, copyright owners filed a suit on a similar theory to enjoin 
the sale of digital audio tape recorders.105 To persuade plaintiffs to drop the 
suit, consumer electronics manufacturers agreed to support legislation 
obliging the makers and sellers of digital audio recording devices and media 
to implement copy-protection technology and to pay royalties to compensate 
copyright owners for forgone sales.106 The 1992 Audio Home Recording Act 
implemented this compromise.107 
In the ensuing years, statutory and regulatory provisions reaching 
makers, and suits to hold them liable as contributory infringers, have 
become familiar. In 1998, the Recording Industry Association of America 
filed an unsuccessful copyright infringement suit to enjoin the sale of the 
first portable MP3 player.108 The 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
incorporated both narrow requirements that instrument makers implement 
copy-protection technology and broad prohibitions on making, selling, 
trafficking in, or providing instruments that might facilitate infringing acts 
by defeating copy-protection technology.109 Some copyright owners 
maintain that Internet service providers should be obliged to redesign their 
architecture to incorporate infringement-prevention technology.110 This 
 
 103. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 
1979), rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 104. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). 
 105. Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90-CIV-4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jul. 9, 1990). 
 106. See H.R. REP. No. 102-873, pt. 1 (1992). 
 107. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006)). One of the law’s provisions prohibits 
copyright infringement suits against consumers for noncommercial copying of musical 
recordings; the scope of that provision remains controversial. 
 108. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 
2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). The court refused to enter the 
injunction. 180 F.3d at 1081. 
 109. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2680 (1998) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1332). 
 110. See Saul Hansell, Bits Debate: Should Internet Service Providers Block Copyrighted Works, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2008, 11:41 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/bits-debate-
should-internet-providers-block-copyrighted-works; Mehan Jayasuriya, Jef Pearlman, Robb 
Topolski, Michael Weinberg & Sherwin Siy, Forcing the Net Through a Sieve: Why Copyright Filtering 
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expansion in the scope of copyright has encouraged copyright owners to 
insist that making money from copyrighted works should be actionable 
without regard to whether the entity earning the money is invading the 
copyright owners’ express statutory prerogatives by actually reproducing, 
publicly distributing, or publicly performing their works. 
There are a variety of troubling developments associated with this 
particular trend. First, the effort to hold makers liable as contributory 
infringers for facilitating enjoyment of works of authorship in unauthorized 
ways has required copyright owners to claim that the readers, listeners, and 
viewers who make use of the new devices and methods are direct infringers. 
The alleged direct infringers are not themselves before the court and cannot 
argue that their uses are within the law, and the defendant–makers have 
only limited incentives to argue on their behalf.111 That has resulted in 
inexorable rights-creep as courts assume without deciding, or decide without 
reflecting, that a variety of personal uses violate the copyright law.112 The 
legal cloud on profiting from new devices or services that enable enjoyment 
of works of authorship, meanwhile, deters investment in businesses that 
might further copyright’s core goals by increasing the audience for works of 
authorship or the value of paying to enjoy them.113 Those new opportunities 
may eat into the market share of the businesses that currently dominate the 
dissemination of works of authorship, but may also encourage greater 
dissemination and enjoyment of extant works as well as the creation of new 
ones. It makes little policy sense, then, to give the businesses that currently 
dominate the market for works of authorship the ability to prevent the 
development of new instruments, at least absent a persuasive showing that 
makers were reaping too much and creators or distributors too little under 
the current allocation of rights, such that a simple wealth transfer would 
improve the health of the system. We have never given copyright owners the 
right to control the sale, purchase, or use of pencils, crayons, paper, scissors, 
or glue, despite the near-certainty that sometimes they will be used to 
commit infringing acts. The same principle should apply to circuit boards, 
transistors, and electrons. 
 
Is Not a Viable Solution for U.S. ISPs, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (2009), http://www.publicknowledge. 
org/pdf/pk-filtering-whitepaper-200907.pdf. 
 111. Defendants who worry that a court may be reluctant to leave copyright owners with no 
remedy may determine that throwing non-party alleged direct infringers under the bus is a 
better strategy than insisting that no infringement has occurred. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, 
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130–33 (2d Cir. 2008); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–63 (9th Cir. 2007); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 112. E.g., MGM v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 925–27 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014–19 (9th Cir. 2001); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah 
Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999). 
 113. See Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 
(2008). 
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D. SUMMARY 
The current copyright statute is long, complicated, and difficult to 
understand. It instantiates a copyright system that places daunting obstacles 
in front of creators who seek to author works and convey them to audiences. 
A host of amendments and expansive court rulings have gradually shrunk 
the zone of liberty within which readers, listeners, and viewers are free to 
enjoy works. Distributors face the threat that cheap, easy, digital copying will 
undermine their business models at the same time as they find that licensing 
has become complicated and expensive. Makers of new devices and services 
for enjoying copyrighted works, meanwhile, face threats of ruinous 
litigation. As a result, many members of the public who are being called 
upon to follow the extant copyright rules in their daily lives have decided 
that the rules are unfair or unreasonable, or that they don’t in fact do what 
they’re claimed to do. The erosion in copyright’s legitimacy is itself 
problematic for the health of the copyright system. 
II. COPYRIGHT REFORM REALISM 
The problems I’ve just raised are not the major focus of current efforts 
to stake out positions in connection with future copyright reform.114 
Instead, representatives of major copyright players currently seem to see 
statutory reform as an opportunity to cement their most heroic (by which I 
mean least plausible) victories115 and reverse their unanticipated defeats.116 
 
 114. Copyright scholars have, in fact, made a number of thoughtful proposals for recasting 
copyright law to give greater benefit to authors or to the public. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, 
PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004); Ginsburg, 
supra note 64, at 286–88; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free 
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003); Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime To Enable Public Interest 
Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007); Pamela 
Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551. As far as I can 
discern, none of these proposals seems to have attracted serious legislative attention. 
 115. E.g., Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 
1997) (holding that making a copy available for patrons to view in a non-circulating library 
violated the distribution right); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 
1994) (holding that photocopying articles for scientific research purposes was not fair use); 
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that turning on 
a computer violates the reproduction right of the owner of the copyright in the operating-
system software); United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 
2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that downloading a recorded music file does not perform it). 
 116. E.g., Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (holding that 
downloading a recorded music file does not perform it). The usual outcome is for the two sides 
to agree on legislation that accepts the general principle underlying the heroic, implausible 
victory while rejecting its application in factual situations similar to those presented in the 
lawsuit. See Litman, supra note 59, at 592–93. Thus, MAI Systems Corp., 991 F.2d 511, held that a 
computer-maintenance service made infringing copies of software when it turned on computers 
to service them. The holding was a surprising and controversial reading of the statutory 
language. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NII Intellectual Property Report, COMMS. 
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There’s little serious attention paid to the idea that we may be able to build 
a cheaper, more efficient, and better distribution system for copyrighted 
works without bribing intermediaries by first endowing and then divesting 
creators. Most industry proposals to reform copyright law to accommodate 
networked digital technology are taking the opposite approach: they seek to 
broaden distributor rights and augment distributor control to compensate 
for the supposed decrease in copyright owner incentives effected by the 
threat of cheap and abundant unlicensed copies.117 
The gist of many of the proposals currently making the rounds is to 
shore up weaknesses in the positions of established distributors and to 
strengthen their claims against makers and other intermediaries as well as 
readers, listeners, and viewers. Thus, some copyright owners support 
replacing the convoluted and outdated licensing provisions in the statute 
with language that would streamline licensing when they seek licenses, while 
requiring their permission when others seek licenses from them.118 Others 
seek to enhance copyright-owner control over uses of copyrighted works, to 
enable owners to monetize, or at least monitor, any uses that have value.119 
These ideas would extend copyright rights and enforcement to myriad 
personal uses, including uses that are noncommercial and nonpublic, on the 
theory that copyright should enable copyright owners to profit from and 
control all valuable uses of their works.120 
The story told in support of these efforts is that networked digital 
technology poses a fundamental threat to the copyright system, by making it 
easy and cheap for individuals to make multiple perfect copies of works in 
digital formats and to distribute those copies all over the world.121 The 
 
OF THE ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21. As part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Congress 
enacted an express exemption for computer-maintenance services to turn on computers to 
service them, but, bowing to industry pressure, didn’t repudiate the surprising general 
conclusion that turning on a computer, without more, could constitute infringement of the 
copyright in the computer’s operating-system software. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006). 
 117. See, e.g., Karen Dearne, Secrecy Claims on Copyright Treaty, AUSTRALIAN IT (Aug. 19, 
2008), http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/0,24897,24202770-5013044,00.html. 
 118. See generally Section 115 of the Copyright Act, supra note 85; Internet Streaming of Radio 
Broadcasts, supra note 85. This posture has made resolution of the music and sound recording 
licensing provisions of §§ 114 and 115 elusive. 
 119. See, e.g., Ensuring Artists Fair Compensation: Updating the Performance Right and Platform 
Parity for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1–3 (2007) (statement of Rep. Berman); id. at 31–33 
(testimony of Judy Collins, recording artist); An Update: Piracy on University Networks, supra note 
51, at 1–3 (statement of Rep. Berman); id. at 6–8 (testimony of Cary Sherman); Content 
Protection in the Digital Age: The Broadcast Flag, High-Definition Radio, and the Analog Hole: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 6–8 (2005) [hereinafter Content Protection in the Digital Age] (testimony of Dan 
Glickman); id. at 11–13 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, RIAA). 
 120. See Litman, supra note 59, at 595–99.  
 121. See Ginsburg, supra note 81; see also, e.g., Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003: 
Hearing on H.R. 2517 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the H. 
LITMAN_PDF.DOC 10/28/2010  1:48 PM 
2010] REAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 27 
cheap and easy availability of unlicensed copies is said to have severely 
undermined the copyright incentive by depriving copyright owners of 
control of the mass distribution of their works.122 Unless we repair the leaks 
in the copyright dike, some copyright owners claim, authors will be reluctant 
to create new works and publishers, motion picture companies, and record 
labels will be reluctant to make the investment in distributing them.123 Thus, 
it is essential to augment available legal tools to restore copyright owner 
control over the making and distribution of copies of works, and (they 
continue) we have in fact bound ourselves to do just that in signing 
intellectual property treaties with our trading partners.124 At the same time, 
they insist, copyright owners are entitled to the benefit of new forms of 
revenue that networked digital technology makes available, and the 
copyright statute should clarify that control of those new uses belongs, and 
should belong, to the owners of the copyright.125 
It’s worth questioning the premises that underlie this story, which 
embodies what I described earlier as the “conventional law-and-economics 
view of copyright,”126 under which distributors are essential copyright actors 
and their interests simultaneously align with the interests of creators and of 
readers, listeners, and viewers. Whether strong distributor rights benefit 
either creators or readers is an empirical question that has not yet been 
subject to empirical testing.127 It has some intuitive appeal. It is politically 
convenient if one happens to be a lobbyist for a distributor. This notion has 
justified a relentless aggrandizement of distributors’ copyright rights over 
the past 100 years. In that period, the scope of copyright has expanded 
 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 61–66 (2003) (testimony of Maren Christensen, Vice 
President, Intellectual Property Counsel, Universal Studios). 
 122. See, e.g., Stephen Manes, Full Disclosure: Copyright Law—Ignore at Your Own Peril, 
PCWORLD (July 30, 2003, 3:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/111657/full_ 
disclosure_copyright_lawignore_at_your_own_peril.html. 
 123. See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at 81–86; Henry Horbaczewski, Copyright Under Siege: 
Reflections of an In-House Counsel, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 387 (2006). 
 124. See, e.g., Joint Study on 17 U.S.C. Sections 109 and 117: Public Hearing Before the U.S. 
Copyright Office and the Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. (2000), available at http://www.copyright. 
gov/reports/studies/dmca/testimony/transcript.pdf (testimony of Steven Metalitz, 
representing American Film Marketing Association and six other trade groups); Brief of 
Americans for Tax Reform as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees Urging Affirmance at 15–
20, Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-
1480-cv(L), 07-1511-cv(CON)), 2007 WL 6101600. 
 125. See, e.g., Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts, supra note 85, at 37–39 (testimony of 
Steven M. Marks, General Counsel, RIAA). See generally Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: 
The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (critiquing 
argument). 
 126. See PATRY, supra note 30, at 62; Cohen, supra note 125; Zimmerman, supra note 29; 
supra text accompanying notes 76–80. 
 127. See PATRY, supra note 30, at 62; David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. 
L. REV. 1, 2–7 (2004); Zimmerman, supra note 29. 
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enormously.128 The bulk of that expansion has enriched copyright 
intermediaries, rather than creators and readers.129 If apologists for 
distributors are right that creators and readers benefit indirectly from any 
enhancement in distributors’ copyright rights, then enhancing their 
copyright rights still further should automatically enrich us all. If the 
realities of the copyright system undermine its resemblance to the simple 
law-and-economics model, on the other hand, the only thing we may end up 
enhancing by such a course is what economists refer to as “deadweight 
loss.”130 The deficiencies of the copyright system I outlined earlier for the 
creators and readers it is designed to serve may be due at least in part to a 
misallocation of copyright benefits—giving intermediaries more control 
over the dissemination and enjoyment of works than makes sense in a 
networked digital world. 
If the current, modest share of copyright that creators enjoy suffices to 
inspire continued authorship, and the current modest degree of reader, 
listener, and viewer liberties suffices to encourage enjoyment of the works 
that creators produce, one might ask: what work is being done by all that 
money in the middle? Perhaps the incentives the current copyright system 
offers for intermediaries to invest in the production and dissemination of 
works of authorship are simply excessive in a digital world.131 Maybe the 
prospect of hefty monopoly rents has encouraged distributors to spend 
heavily on efforts to constrain the market for competing works or competing 
channels of distribution. Oversize distributor incentives might be 
reinforcing impulses to keep less profitable works from the public to 
enhance the opportunity to market more profitable works. Such a system 
may be encouraging wasteful investment in digital-rights-management 
technology. Indeed, if distributor incentives are excessive, one might expect 
that to inspire a hideously expensive series of lobbying efforts to craft 
copyright provisions that will serve as effective entry barriers to competing 
media. That’s as good a description of the current efforts at copyright 
reform as any. Would the copyright system function as a healthier ecosystem 
if we just got rid of all that extra incentive? 
 
 128. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 54–80 (2008). “Compared 
with their early American counterparts, current copyright holders enjoy a capacious bundle of 
rights in many more uses of many more types of published works for a far greater time and with 
fewer preconditions.” Id. at 55. 
 129. During the fifteen to twenty years that digital dissemination has emerged as a viable 
alternative to distribution of hard copies using factories, store-fronts and trucks, the copyright 
owner’s legal control over potential uses of protected works has grown, rather than ebbed, 
through a massive, almost entirely non-statutory, expansion of the scope of copyright rights. See 
id. at 60–80; Litman, supra note 59, at 593–96.  
 130. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1801–04 
(2000). 
 131. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 870–93 (2001). 
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Suggestions that the sticks in the copyright bundle are already thicker 
than they should be commonly meet an incentive-based objection to any 
reduction in the scope, depth, strength, or duration of copyright rights. 
Diminishing copyright, we are told, will decrease authors’ incentives to 
create and distribute new works, leaving readers, listeners, and viewers with 
fewer new works to enjoy.132 The copyright incentive story turns out to be 
cloudier than its proponents admit. As David McGowan has succinctly 
argued, the economic justification for any particular copyright rule rests on 
instinct and guesswork.133 The economic rationale for copyright law 
ascended to the status of an article of faith in the absence of any empirical 
validation. It may be that in the wake of the 1998 statute increasing the 
duration of all copyrights by twenty years,134 publishers increased the 
advances paid to authors, and motion picture studios gave their 
screenwriters a raise. It could be that, in response to the 1995 Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act,135 musicians greatly increased 
the quality of their musical recordings. As Professor McGowan puts it: “We 
do not have the data, so we cannot do the math, so we cannot say for 
sure.”136 
A wise approach to copyright revision might inspire us to rethink the 
model. If both creators and readers are ill-served by distributor-centric 
copyright, and if the economics of digital distribution now make it possible 
to engage in mass dissemination without significant capital investment, 
perhaps it is time to reallocate the benefits of the copyright system. The 
consolidation of control in distributors’ hands does not appear to have 
made life easier or more remunerative for creators. Copyright lobbyists have 
not shown that recent enhancements to copyright have made it easier or 
more rewarding for readers, listeners, and viewers to enjoy copyrighted 
works. Perhaps the classic picture of copyright is too far removed from its 
reality to be useful. 
Instead of asking how to enhance copyright owner control, I suggest, we 
ought to be asking why.137 Does a particular proposed enhancement of 
copyright-owner prerogatives seem likely to expand opportunities for 
 
 132. See, e.g., I. Fred Koenigsberg, The Fifth Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture: 
Humpty Dumpty in Copyrightland, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 677, 689 (2004).  
 133. McGowan, supra note 127; accord Cohen, supra note 125. 
 134. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 
Stat. 2827, 2827–29 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–304 (1994) to extend the term of copyright 
protection for most works to life plus seventy years). 
 135. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 
Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 114–115 (2006)). 
 136. McGowan, supra note 127, at 26. If people in the copyright-lobbying business believed 
that such an effect could be demonstrated, you’d expect them to try to collect the data, but 
perhaps they don’t believe that Congress needs any persuasion on the point. 
 137. See Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 664 
(2006); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433 (2007). 
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creators or improve reader, listener, or viewer enjoyment of copyrighted 
works? Is it likely to make the copyright system simpler, more effective, or 
more transparent? Does it seem to be designed to shore up copyright’s 
apparent legitimacy? If not, it is liable to make the current mess worse 
instead of better. 
If a copyright system is intended to encourage creation, dissemination, 
and enjoyment of works of authorship, it might make sense to redraw the 
lines with the purpose of putting fewer burdens than current law on 
creation, dissemination, and enjoyment. This seems like a dangerous idea to 
those deeply steeped in current copyright practice, because burdening 
creation, dissemination, and enjoyment is an important way in which 
copyright is thought to “promote the Progress of Science.” That approach 
requires us to reject the notion that robust use is somehow inconsistent with 
or undermining of the goals of copyright. Robust use is itself a core goal of 
copyright—encouraging it is the reason we have come to allow distributors 
so much control. If, in fact, extensive distributor control of copyrighted 
works is not clearly advancing the interests of either creators or readers, it 
seems likely that our ideas of how the system actually works need to be 
rethought. 
III. THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT REFORM 
There appears to be a broad consensus among scholars and journalists 
that what Jane Ginsburg has called “greed” has undermined copyright’s 
legitimacy.138 Some copyright professionals comfort one another with the 
assertion that appearances deceive; the alleged illegitimacy is really nothing 
of the sort. It is instead, they might argue, the combination of the voices of 
noisy teenage pirates, who think they should get something for nothing, with 
the misguided critiques of copyright academics.139 The fact that mainstream 
media everywhere have recently come to question whether copyright has 
become unmoored from its constitutional purpose,140 they suggest, misstates 
 
 138. Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 61; see, e.g., Editorial, We Aren’t All Pirates, L.A. TIMES, July 
10, 2006, at B10. 
 139. See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at 30–39, 213–14; Horbaczewski, supra note 123, at 
393; Internet Anti-Piracy Task Force, Nat’l Music Publishers Ass’n, The Engine of Free 
Expression: Copyright on the Internet, http://web.archive.org/web/2005-2004re_/http:// 
www.nmpa.org/music101/copyrights.asp. 
 140. See, e.g., Editorial, Buyer Beware: Music, Technology Industries Reach an Agreement That 
Neglects Consumers’ Rights, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 2003, at A8; Editorial, Free Mickey Mouse, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at A16; Editorial, Grokster and the Information Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 30, 2004, at A18; Editorial, The Genuine Article: Appealing to Consumers’ Better Nature May Be 
a More Effective Way To Curtail Rampant Piracy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at M2; Editorial, Tune 
in Fairness for Broadcast Music: Artists, Broadcasters Should Work Together for Solutions, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, June 14, 2009, at 28A; Steven Levy, Info with a Ball and Chain, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 2003, 
at 59; Music Industry Fight To Block Net Access Hits New Lows, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2002, at 22A. 
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real popular opinion, which supports copyright (or would, if we only 
exposed our children to their copyright education programs141). 
My intuition is that Ginsburg was right when she suggested that the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term extension bill, which added twenty years to the 
term of all extant copyrights and vested that extended term in the copyright 
proprietor rather than the author, would paradoxically weaken copyright by 
undermining public support for the entire enterprise.142 I suspect that 
copyright appears most legitimate to the general public when it most 
transparently and directly serves its core goals of encouraging authorship 
and enjoyment of copyrighted works. The copyright story that the public is 
eager to invest in is a story about authors and readers. I can’t prove this; I 
have no more data than the conventional copyright economic theorists who 
suggest that it makes little difference whether the copyright law gives the 
goodies to creators, readers, or the distributors between them, but I believe 
it to be true. (Lobbyists for major copyright players appear to believe it to be 
true as well, since they cast their arguments to Congress for more expansive 
copyright rights in appealing claims made on authors’ and readers’ 
behalf.)143 If I’m right, recent efforts to persuade Congress and the public 
that the copyright law has never incorporated “user rights”144 are short 
sighted and counter-productive. The public’s fascination with “fair use 
rights,” bemoaned by some members of the copyright bar,145 is in fact a sign 
of broad public acceptance of and support for copyright laws, when 
copyright laws are understood as embodying readers’ rights as well as 
authors’ rights. 
I also believe, but can’t prove, that the deterioration in public support 
for copyright is the gravest of the dangers facing the copyright law in a 
digital era. Copyright stakeholders have let copyright law’s legitimacy 
 
 141. See William Patry, Non-profit, Non-partisan Education in Copyright, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT 
BLOG (Sept. 12, 2007, 7:53 AM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2007/09/non-profit-non-
partisan-education-in.html. 
 142. See Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 
18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 701 (2000); see also Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 65. 
 143. See, e.g., The Performance Rights Act, supra note 58, at 4–6, 36–38 (testimony of Sheila 
Escovedo, Recording Artist, MusicFIRST Coalition). 
 144. See, e.g., David R. Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. Copyright 
Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 345 (2005); Koenigsberg, supra note 132; Randy Picker, Fair 
Use v. Fair Access, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 603 (2008); Patrick Ross, The Remix Culture, COPYRIGHT 
ALLIANCE BLOG (July 7, 2008, 2:50 PM), http://blog.copyrightalliance.org/2008/07/the-
remix-culture/. 
 145. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 144, at 381 (“Time and again, congressional hearings 
have been tainted with the indefensible agendas of those who have a thinly concealed interest 
in decreasing copyright protection.”); Koenigsberg, supra note 132, at 679 (“[E]nemies of 
creativity . . . speak of the fair use ‘right.’ But there is no ‘right’ to fair use.”); Patrick Ross, 
Perspective: Fair Use Is Not a Consumer Right, CNET (Sept. 6, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/Fair-
use-is-not-a-consumer-right/2010-1030_3-6205977.html. 
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crumble (or have undermined it with ill-considered campaigns146 and 
strategic blunders),147 while comforting themselves with the promise that 
soon, technology would allow them to actually prevent copyright 
infringement rather than merely to forbid or deter it.148 The lack of public 
support for copyright norms, then, would soon lose much of its bite, as 
people rushed to the stores to buy devices that would decline to make 
infringing copies or to play infringing content. I alluded earlier to the costs 
of such a strategy: burdening reader, listener, and viewer enjoyment of 
works by encasing the works in technology that meters and monitors 
exposure undermines one of copyright’s essential goals. A dozen years into 
the digital rights management (“DRM”)149 experiment, moreover, it seems 
clear that it has not yet made a meaningful dent in copyright infringement 
of works released in DRM-protected forms. DRM has proved so far to be easy 
enough to hack to function as the sort of speed bump that is no impediment 
to deliberate infringers but still frustrates legitimate listeners when they try 
to play the music they bought on iTunes on their Palm Pre.150 
Circumvention tools are widely available, and widely perceived as 
 
 146. Different scholars have different nominations for which campaigns were the most 
counterproductive. My own list includes Sony’s rootkit, see Sony BMG Settles FTC Charges, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/01/sony.shtm, the effort to 
expand the distribution right under § 106(3) to encompass “making available,” see Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 578 n.1 (2008), 
and the “John Doe” lawsuits against individual peer-to-peer file sharers, see, e.g., Capitol Records 
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (MJD/RLE), 2009 WL 1664468 (D. Minn. June 11, 2009).  
 147. Here, I would point to the prosecution of Dmitry Skylarov and the threat to sue Ed 
Felten and his research team for presenting a scholarly paper on the team’s decryption research 
on the Secure Digital Music Initiative’s technologies. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. 
Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Case No. CV-01-2669 
(D.N.J. filed June 6, 2001). 
 148. See Content Protection in the Digital Age, supra note 119, at 6–8 (testimony of Dan 
Glickman); Jeffrey Cunard, Technological Protection of Copyrighted Works and Copyright 
Management Systems: A Brief Survey of the Landscape, in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES TO 
COPYRIGHT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALAI CONGRESS JUNE 13–17, 2001 (Jane C. Ginsburg & June 
M. Besek eds., 2002), available at http://www.alai-usa.org/2001_conference/pres_cunard.doc; 
Lionel S. Sobel, DRM as an Enabler of Business Models: ISPs as Digital Retailers, 18 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 667 (2003). 
 149. Copyright owners have used digital rights management technologies since the earliest 
days of digital distribution. In 1998, Congress added provisions to title 17 prohibiting the 
circumvention of DRM technologies designed to control access to works and prohibiting the 
marketing of devices or the provision of services to circumvent a wider category of DRM 
technologies. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). See generally Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, 
Should Copyright Owners Have To Give Notice of Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 41 (2007). 
 150. See Larry Magid, Podcast: iTunes Cuts Off Palm Pre Sync, CNET (July 16, 2009), http:// 
news.cnet.com/8301-19518_3-10288094-238.html; Charlie Sorrel, Sync Your Palm Pre with 
iTunes. Again, WIRED (July 17, 2009), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/07/sync-your-
palm-pre-with-itunes-again/. 
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legitimate,151 despite the provisions in § 1201 of title 17 making it illegal to 
“circumvent a technological measure” or to “manufacture, import, offer to 
the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, 
device, component, or part” designed to help one to do so.152 We face a real 
danger that by the time the content industries realize that technological 
protection measures cannot be effective without public consensus that they 
work to achieve sensible goals by reasonable means, the public will have 
decided that much of copyright law is neither sensible nor reasonable. 
Real copyright reform should seek to make the copyright system more 
effective and to enhance its legitimacy. I believe that in order to accomplish 
that, reform should focus on four interrelated goals: radical simplification, 
creator empowerment, reader empowerment, and disintermediation. 
A. RADICAL SIMPLIFICATION 
I have banged this drum before, repeatedly.153 The copyright law is 
long, complex, counterintuitive and packed with traps and pitfalls, some of 
which were inserted intentionally to trip unwary new entrants, hapless 
authors, or pesky potential competitors.154 Market leaders in the 
entertainment and information businesses have learned to use copyright 
legislation as an opportunity to erect market barriers to block their nascent 
competition.155 That may be an unavoidable by-product of our copyright 
lawmaking process, but it’s hard to argue that it’s an advantage we should try 
to preserve. Millions of dollars spent by readers, listeners, and viewers to pay 
for opportunities to enjoy copyrighted works are absorbed by our 
mechanisms for collection and distribution before more than token 
amounts make it into creators’ pockets. That, too, is a disadvantage rather 
than an advantage of our legacy copyright system. Finally, the fact that legacy 
copyright rules bind ordinary people engaging in everyday transactions, but 
are too complicated to explain to them, is nothing for us to be proud of. If 
we can find the political will to change these facts of copyright, we should do 
so; they are artifacts of a nineteenth- and twentieth-century copyright system 
whose major raison d’être is that it has taken copyright lawyers a long time 
 
 151. See, e.g., Walter Mossberg, Some Cures for the Multiple iPod Blues, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2006, at 30 (“[H]ere’s how to use an iPod to copy music to multiple computers.”); Sorrel, supra 
note 150 (reviewing third-party workarounds to enable Palm Pre owners to use iTunes); Mac the 
Ripper, GUSTAVUS ADOPLHUS COLLEGE, https://gustavus.edu/gts/Mac_the_Ripper (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2010) (explaining that the college has installed software for ripping DVDs to the hard 
drive of a computer “so that you can copy it” on machines in its media center). 
 152. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (b)(1). 
 153. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right To Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 
50–52 (1994).  
 154. E.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 203, 304, 1008. 
 155. See Litman, supra note 59, at 593–94. 
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to learn to work with it, and we are loathe to lose our investment in time and 
intellectual exertion. 
Copyright lawyers have great affection for the arcane bits of the current 
system. Knowing how to navigate distinctions that make no apparent sense 
proves our membership in a priestly class of copyright-knowers. The 
arcaneness of the rules is tolerable when the club of copyright rule followers 
is small. If we are going to insist that the rules apply more broadly, though, 
we need to make them sensible, and a necessary first step is to make them 
simpler. We don’t actually need seven different copyright rights, each with 
its own subject matter limitations, scope, and exceptions.156 If you tell the 
owner of a sports bar that the copyright statute allows him to operate up to 
six television sets in his sports bar so long as the picture is turned off, but 
only one television set if the picture is turned on,157 he will understandably 
tell you that the law is loony. Nor should we be proud of our bouquet of 
compulsory licenses, each with its own distinct terms, procedures, rates, 
conditions, and its own collection and disbursement process.158 
There are statutory sections so complex that even copyright experts 
claim not to understand them.159 Unless our goal is to make it impossible 
for creators, distributors, and readers to navigate the copyright system 
without representation, there’s no excuse for that. 
B. CREATOR EMPOWERMENT 
In Part I, I explored some of the problems the current copyright system 
poses for creators. Using the copyright reform opportunity to remake the 
copyright system into a more creator-friendly scheme could enhance both its 
 
 156. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A, 107–122. 
 157. Compare id. § 110(5)(A) (permitting the public performance of a broadcast on a single 
receiving set of the sort found in private homes), with id. § 110(5)(B) (permitting the public 
performance of the broadcast of only non-dramatic musical works using multiple speakers and 
display screens). 
 158. See id. §§ 111(d), 112(e), 114(d), 115, 118, 119, 122; see also id. § 116 (“negotiated” 
jukebox license). 
 159. E.g., id. § 114 (“[s]cope of exclusive rights in sound recordings”). Former Register of 
Copyrights Ralph Oman had this to say: 
 Somewhere in this favored land a copyright Pooh-bah really understands 
Section 111 (eight pages covering secondary transmissions by cable), Section 114 
(18 pages covering the scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings and, now, 
webcasting), Section 115 (almost seven pages covering the compulsory license for 
making and distributing phonorecords, including digital delivery), and Sections 
119 and 122 (almost 17 pages covering secondary transmissions by satellite). The 
current Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, has stated publicly that there are 
large chunks of Section 114 that are utterly incomprehensible to most people, 
because over the years Congress has spliced and diced them, and then hemstitched 
them back together. 
Ralph Oman, Going Back to First Principles: The Exclusive Rights of Authors Reborn, 8 J. HIGH 
TECH. L. 169, 172–73 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
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legitimacy and its effectiveness in encouraging the creation and 
dissemination of works of authorship. 
Many European nations cast their copyright law as an “authors’ rights” 
law, and build in a variety of creator-centric rules.160 In the United States, 
we’ve purported to pursue a different model: our law encourages creators 
who wish to exploit their works commercially to assign all rights to an 
intermediary in return for some amount of money.161 In most cases, the 
intermediary distributor will make the work available to the public within a 
fairly narrow time window, or will decide not to do so. The work will find its 
audience, or not; the initial marketing effort will run its course. For the vast 
majority of creators, the works will then enter a dormant phase that will last 
for the remainder of the copyright term.162 Distributors have only modest 
incentives to invest real money in exploiting their backlists in new media or 
marketing them to new generations.163 That is one reason why, before 
Congress made copyright renewal automatic, the overwhelming majority of 
works with registered copyrights were never renewed.164 
When new opportunities and new media arise, creators who have 
assigned their copyrights lack the power to license their works for new uses; 
the copyright owners, meanwhile, may see little percentage in exploiting the 
new media themselves or in licensing their back catalogues to potential 
competitors.165 A large number of works that people still want to read, hear, 
and see are unavailable without regard to whether their creators are eager to 
exploit them.166 
 
 160. E.g., Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I at 1273, as amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 26, 
2007, BGBL I at 2513, §§ 29–42 (Ger.) (German provisions on transfers and licenses of 
copyright); Texto Refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual tit. II, ch. III, §§ 14–16 (B.O.E. 
1996, 1) (Spain’s droit morale), available at http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/ 
rdleg1-1996.html#. 
 161. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29. 
 162. See, e.g., Orphan Works Fact Sheet, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, http://futureofmusic. 
org/article/fact-sheet/orphan-works (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
 163. See, e.g., DUKE CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUB. DOMAIN, ACCESS TO ORPHAN FILMS 1–3 
(2005), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/pdf/cspdorphanfilm.pdf. 
 164. See Copyright Renewal Provisions: Hearing on S. 756 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 25–31 (1991) (statement of 
Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights). 
 165. Some copyright contracts are construed by courts to reserve rights to license uses in 
new media, see, e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
Other contracts have express reversion terms, which are common in trade-book publishing 
contracts, see RICHARD CURTIS, HOW TO BE YOUR OWN LITERARY AGENT 106–13 (2003), but not 
so common in most other fields, see, e.g., PASSMAN, supra note 38, at 245, 259–61, 392–94, 397. 
 166. See, e.g., TIM BROOKS, SURVEY OF REISSUES OF U.S. RECORDINGS 4–14 (2005), available 
at http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub133/pub133.pdf; Joel Rose, Copyright Laws Severely 
Limit Availability of Music, NPR.ORG (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyId=5139522&ft=1&f=2.  
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Creators are in theory entitled to reclaim their copyrights under the 
statute’s termination-of-transfer provisions.167 Congress intended the 
termination provisions to give authors an opportunity to recapture their 
copyrights after their assignees have had a reasonable opportunity to exploit 
the assigned rights.168 In general, thirty-five years after any grant, an author 
may notify the grantee that she is reclaiming her rights. The grantee must 
receive at least two years notice, and may continue to exploit any derivative 
works it created even after the grant is terminated.169 In the negotiations 
leading to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, authors’ 
representatives pressed to protect their opportunity to recapture their 
copyrights from the demands of publishers that they assign any rights in 
copyright renewal or extension at the time they signed their original 
publication agreements. Distributors received a longer period of time before 
termination rights could be executed and express protection for the 
continued exploitation of derivative works—both significant improvements 
for them over the renewal provisions of the 1909 Act. In return for making 
termination inalienable, moreover, publishers and film studios insisted on 
making it difficult.170 It is, in fact, sufficiently difficult to be largely illusory 
for most creators. When Congress extended the duration of copyright in 
1976 and 1998, it vested the extended term in the current copyright 
proprietor, subject to a similar termination right that has proved similarly 
problematic for authors and their heirs.171 Court decisions, meanwhile, have 
 
 167. 17 U.S.C §§ 203, 304(c), 304(d) (2006); see Returning Authors Rights: The CC 
Termination of Transfer Tool [Beta]: Frequently Asked Questions, CREATIVE COMMONS LABS, http:// 
labs.creativecommons.org/demos/termination/faq.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2010); 
Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under 17 U.S.C. § 203, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www. 
copyright.gov/docs/203.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).  
 168. U.S. copyright law has since 1831 incorporated provisions designed to allow authors to 
recapture their copyrights from assignees. See Barbara Ringer, Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright, 
in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503 (Copyright Soc’y of the U.S.A. ed., 1963). Until 1976, 
copyrights expired after an initial term, and the author or the authors’ heirs could apply for a 
second, “renewal” term, which vested free and clear of initial term assignments. The renewal 
provisions, however, were unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, authors and their heirs didn’t 
understand the provisions well enough to follow the statutory steps. Second, copyright owners 
routinely required authors to assign their renewal expectancies at the same time they made 
their initial copyright assignment, and courts had upheld the validity of these advance grants. 
Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 383 (1960); Fred Fisher Music Co. 
v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943). That meant that authors as a practical matter 
were unable to recapture their rights. See Ringer, supra.  
 169. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 891–93 (1987). Authors of older works have a parallel right to terminate 
at the beginning of the nineteen-year copyright extension enacted in 1976 and the twenty-year 
copyright extension enacted in 1988. 17 U.S.C. § 304.  
 170. See Litman, supra note 169, at 892; Burroughs v. MGM, Inc., 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
 171. See Burroughs, 683 F.2d at 620–31; Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, No. 10 Civ. 141 
(CM)(KNF), 2010 WL 1655253, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2010); Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
LITMAN_PDF.DOC 10/28/2010  1:48 PM 
2010] REAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 37 
narrowed the scope of the rights subject to recapture,172 and upheld 
assignee strategies for evading termination by renegotiating the underlying 
contract before the date termination becomes available.173 
Thus, we have a system that makes creators’ rights easy to assign and 
exceptionally difficult to recapture. Depending on the terms of their 
copyright assignments, creators commonly have little control over the 
exploitation of their works in new markets or media. The detachment of 
copyrights from the creators who author works enhances the perception of 
copyright as illegitimate and unconnected with the progress of science.174 
Affording creators a mechanism to regain some control of the exploitation 
of their works could shore up copyright’s legitimacy by strengthening the 
connection between creators and copyrights throughout the long copyright 
term. It could also give distributors and makers new opportunities to exploit 
old works in new ways that older media might deem unprofitable or a poor 
fit with extant business models. If reversion is a feature that has value to the 
overall copyright system, wise copyright reform should replace the current, 
largely illusory termination provisions with a recapture mechanism that 
might actually function as advertised. 
C. READER EMPOWERMENT 
Copyright laws have a special place in our jurisprudence. That special 
place includes a presumption of First Amendment validity.175 In Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, the Supreme Court dismissed a First Amendment challenge to the 
1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, noting that so long as “Congress has 
not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First 
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”176 That seems paradoxical: copyright 
laws regulate expression more directly that most laws that routinely undergo 
First Amendment review. The key to the paradox is that copyright laws have 
traditionally encouraged expression while preserving the liberty to read, 
listen, and view the expression copyright protects. The importance of 
reading, listening, and viewing is a vital reason that copyright laws get special 
treatment. The freedom to read, listen, and view are essential attributes of 
human freedom, so much so that we take them for granted. They are 
 
 172. See Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 177–78 (1985); Copyright Holder Protection 
Act: Hearing on S. 1384 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 40–42 (1985) (statement of Barbara Ringer); Litman, supra note 169, 
at 901–02. 
 173. See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2008); Lydia 
Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the “Inalienable” Right To Terminate, 
62 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1611256; Scott, 
supra note 45. 
 174. See PATRY, supra note 30, at 67–96, 171–75. 
 175. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 176. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).  
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inextricable from the freedom to think. The liberties to read, listen, and 
view are crucial foundational liberties on which all copyright systems are 
built. Without those liberties, no copyright system makes any sense. 
If copyright law secures rights for readers, listeners, and viewers, where 
are they? As I discussed in Part I, those rights have lived, for the most part, in 
the white spaces defined by successive copyright statutes. Early copyright 
statutes limited copyright owners to the exclusive rights to print, reprint, 
publish, and vend—they didn’t extend to uses that readers, listeners, and 
viewers might make of copyrighted works. So long as copyright laws left 
individual readers, listeners, and viewers alone, no conflict arose. When 
copyright laws are narrowly drawn, it is easy to forget that readers’ interests 
have any importance in the copyright scheme. For most of our history, 
copyright laws were cast more narrowly than they are today, and this set of 
issues came up only rarely. Today, of course, copyright rights are broader, 
and conflicts between copyright owners and readers, listeners, and viewers 
abound.177 Even in the context of today’s expansive copyright rights, 
though, the statute includes significant white spaces in which readers, 
listeners, and viewers are at liberty to enjoy copyright works the way they 
want to.178 These white spaces, I would argue, are part of the traditional 
contours the Supreme Court mentioned in Eldred—they advance copyright’s 
goals and the First Amendment by securing liberty to read, listen, look at, 
and think. In Lawful Personal Use, I called these reader, listener, and viewer 
rights “copyright liberties.” They have been embedded in the fabric of U.S. 
copyright law since its early history and are essential to its design.179 
As copyright owners have sought to control and monetize individual 
uses, though, they have increasingly argued that what readers, listeners, and 
viewers think of as user rights are instead contingent privileges extended to 
users by copyright owners as a matter of grace and good business sense, 
subject to being withdrawn whenever a business reason for doing so 
appears.180 The general public’s disenchantment with copyright law derives 
 
 177. See NETANEL, supra note 128, at 109–53 (detailing the burdens contemporary 
copyright law places on free speech). 
 178. See Litman, supra note 55, at 1895–1919.  
 179. Id. at 1904–08. 
 180. The most notorious example is the question whether the law permits consumer 
copying of recorded music from a CD to a computer or digital playback device. During oral 
argument in MGM v. Grokster, Petitioner’s counsel made the following representation: “The 
record companies, my clients, have said, for some time now, and it’s been on their Website for 
some time now, that it’s perfectly lawful to take a CD that you’ve purchased, upload it onto your 
computer, put it onto your iPod.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 832356 at *14. Ten months later, in a filing 
opposing exemptions to the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, the record companies 
characterized it somewhat differently: consumers could lawfully copy music to their iPods only 
because copyright owners had granted them a revocable privilege to do so. See Ass’n of Am. 
Publishers et al., RM 2005-11, Joint Reply Comments at 22 (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www. 
copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/11metalitz_AAP.pdf (“[C]reating a back-up copy of a music 
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in part from copyright owners’ insistence that readers, listeners, and viewers 
are entitled to no rights under copyright. Express recognition of reader, 
listener, and viewer copyright liberties could protect them from 
encroachment, and thus help assure that the copyright system is able to 
achieve that part of its core purpose. It could also help affirm that copyright 
is, indeed, the law that most members of the public would like to believe in. 
D. DISINTERMEDIATION 
Simplifying the law to the point that one doesn’t need a lawyer to be 
able to play, and giving more rights to creators and more freedom to 
readers, listeners, and viewers will necessarily reduce the profusion of 
incentives currently enjoyed by many distributor intermediaries. As I argued 
in Part I, I believe that distributors’ current control of the copyright system 
is itself a major copyright ill. It derives from an era when distribution was 
much more expensive than it can be today. It continues in the twenty-first 
century because of the political power of copyright lobbies, aided by 
members of Congress eager to be glamoured by famous entertainers and 
willing to be persuaded that the only fundamental problem with the United 
States economy is widespread piracy of American creations. 
The copyright system currently offers incentives to copyright owner 
intermediaries that are so substantial that they spend millions of dollars to 
lobby Congress to preserve and shore up the status quo. That suggests that 
the system tolerates, indeed supports, an embarrassing degree of waste. 
Concentrating most of the copyright law’s power in the hands of 
distributors, though, is not merely wasteful. It is independently corrosive of 
the copyright system. Because copyright’s current beneficiaries have the 
political power to prevent Congress from enacting copyright legislation, they 
insist on inserting provisions into new laws that will put their potential 
competitors at a disadvantage. Those impediments in the law make it more 
difficult for creators to reach audiences, and more difficult for readers, 
listeners, and viewers to enjoy works disseminated in new media. They can 
make it impractical to introduce works that creators hope to exploit and 
readers want to enjoy. A significant reduction in distributor intermediary 
incentives might discourage this sort of rent-seeking behavior. Even if it did 
not, a law that recasts current intermediaries as optional players in the 
copyright scheme would be a more sensible law. The intermediaries who 
today control the playing field are, and should be treated as, useful 
participants when they offer services that meet creators’ and readers’ needs, 
but no longer necessary in order to navigate the system. 
 
CD is not a non-infringing use.”); id. at 22 n.46 (“Nor does the fact that permission to make a 
copy in particular circumstances is often or even ‘routinely’ granted necessarily establish that 
the copying is a fair use when the copyright owner withholds that authorization. In this regard, 
the statement attributed to counsel for copyright holders in the Grokster case is simply a 
statement about authorization, not about fair use.” (citations omitted)). 
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E. SUMMARY 
Workable copyright reform should almost certainly be reform that 
addresses the excesses responsible for copyright law’s battered reputation.181 
One important ingredient in such a reform, in my view, is simplicity: as I’ve 
argued elsewhere, the public is far more likely to support a law that seems to 
it to be reasonable, fair, and easy to understand.182 Ideally, copyright reform 
should also shore up the law’s legitimacy by strengthening both the 
connections between copyright and creators and the connections between 
copyright and readers, listeners, and viewers. To accomplish that, it will need 
to dislodge many of the currently entrenched intermediaries who have 
united to block reforms that weaken their control.183 If that requires 
changes that end up weakening copyright’s current strong incentives for 
distributors, all to the good: limiting the excesses of distributor rights may 
have its own salutary effects on the copyright system. If the rewards of 
exclusivity are smaller, it may no longer be worth distributors’ while to invest 
large amounts of money and effort in making it more difficult for potentially 
competing works and competing media to find their audiences. 
IV. REAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 
Thus far, I have argued that real copyright reform should seek to 
improve the ways that the system works for creators and for readers, 
listeners, and viewers. I have suggested that the most important goals of such 
a reform are these: We should try to shore up the currently weakened 
legitimacy of copyright law. We should seek to make the currently complex 
copyright law simple enough that most creators will not need to consult a 
copyright lawyer before making and exploiting works of authorship, and 
most readers, listeners, and viewers will not need to consult a copyright 
lawyer before enjoying them. We should focus on empowering creators and 
readers and should, when it is feasible, do that at the expense of copyright 
intermediaries, who currently hold a counterproductively massive share of 
copyright’s goodies. These goals reinforce each other rather than 
competing, since a simpler, more creator–reader-centric copyright law will 
seem more legitimate and be easier for creators and readers to use; and a 
law with enhanced legitimacy will be complied with more readily and will 
work more effectively. 
There are a variety of ways one could embody these goals in statutory 
reform, and copyright commentators have floated imaginative proposals that 
would help to achieve these goals in many different ways.184 I sketch out my 
 
 181. See Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 65–67. 
 182. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 116–17. 
 183. See A Special Conversation with Marybeth Peters, supra note 13. 
 184. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 114, at 199–258 (proposing alternative system for 
compensating creators); ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
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own favorite proposals below. The conventions of legal scholarship offer me 
an unfair advantage as compared with copyright lawyers, lobbyists, and 
legislative staffers. Because I am fixing my ideas in a law review article, I am 
allowed to propose reforms that have no realistic chance of enactment, 
solely on the excuse that I believe, and will try to persuade you, that the 
reforms I suggest would be wise. I can suggest an agenda of legitimation, 
simplification, creator and reader empowerment, and disintermediation 
without concerning myself (too much) that the legislative process we rely on 
to generate copyright laws ensures that the copyright law is never short, and 
never simple. It has not for years reflected concern with appearing to the 
public to be balanced, fair, or sensible; it pays shockingly little attention to 
the reasonable interests of creators or members of their audiences. Legal 
scholars are encouraged to dance in the realm of pure theory, where even 
outlandish ideas may be food for someone’s thought. Thus, I don’t actually 
need to worry about the fact that I see no plausible route by which we could 
get there from here. I have nonetheless worried long and hard about 
coming up with proposals that would actually work, if only we could get 
there. 
A. REDEFINE THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT RIGHTS 
Copyright rights should secure to creators the right to exploit their 
works commercially while assuring that readers, listeners, and viewers have 
the ability to enjoy the works in ways that don’t involve commercial 
 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 69–85, 147–65 (2010) (proposing expansion of moral rights); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN AN INTERCONNECTED 
WORLD 250–59 (2001) (proposing short renewable copyright terms, new compulsory licenses, 
and absolving defendants of liability if they can prove lack of harm to the copyright owner); 
NETANEL, supra note 128, at 195–217 (proposing reforms to facilitate use and preservation of 
orphan works and a noncommercial use levy to compensating copyright owners for 
noncommercial peer-to-peer file sharing); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
1087, 1122 (2007) (proposing an administrative body with authority to adjudicate fair use 
petitions and issue fair use rulings); Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 286–88, 301–06 (proposing 
copyright amendment giving human creators waivable attribution rights); Mark A. Lemley & R. 
Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1345, 1410 (2004) (proposing streamlined administrative dispute resolution for small 
claims against consumers engaging in infringement over peer-to-peer networks); Loren, supra 
note 88, at 703 (proposing replacing six exclusive rights with single “‘right to commercially 
exploit’ the copyrighted expression”); R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music 
Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 268–
73 (2001) (proposing legislation to extend existing compulsory licenses and exemptions to 
temporary RAM storage incidental to licensed or exempt uses); Samuelson, supra note 114, at 
556 (outlining the provisions of a model copyright law); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, 
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 497–
510 (2009) (proposing amendments to copyright damages provisions); Christopher Sprigman, 
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 551 (2004) (proposing the adoption of “new 
style” Berne-compliant formalities); Stadler, supra note 67, at 746–57 (proposing amendments to 
narrow the scope of the public performance right).  
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exploitation. The law now on the books divides copyright into reproduction, 
derivative work, public distribution, public performance, and public display 
rights,185 and encourages authors to dispose of them separately and 
piecemeal.186 In many copyright industries, it has become conventional for 
different copyright rights to be separately controlled by different 
intermediaries.187 As new opportunities to exploit works have arisen, those 
intermediaries have insisted that the new uses impinge on the rights they 
control instead of or as well as the rights controlled by other 
intermediaries.188 Meanwhile, the distinctions among different exclusive 
copyright rights have come to seem increasingly inapposite to a networked 
digital world. When someone views a website or listens to a song over the 
Internet, is she committing a reproduction, a distribution, a performance or 
display, or all of them at once?189 Is the person responsible for any invasion 
of exclusive copyright rights the individual viewer/listener, the owner of the 
computer hosting the files, the computer network that enables remote 
viewing and listening, or someone else?190 Efforts to find a solution that 
would permit prospective licensees to obtain necessary licenses in a single 
transaction have failed because entrenched intermediaries cannot agree on 
which of them is the appropriate licensor.191 Congress has been unwilling to 
characterize the different exclusive rights as exclusive of each other, rather 
than overlapping;192 courts have been unwilling to apply statutory 
exceptions defined in terms of one exclusive right to the same behavior 
 
 185. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 186. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). 
 187. The canonical example is music, where the public performance rights are licensed by 
performing rights societies, like ASCAP, while music publishers control the reproduction and 
distribution rights. See PASSMAN, supra note 38, at 206–38. See generally Music Licensing Reform, 
supra note 78. 
 188. To stick with the music example, ASCAP insists that both transmission of a file 
containing recorded music over the Internet and the playing of a music ring-tone on a cellular 
phone should be deemed public performances within its purview. Music publishers insist that 
the transmission of the files and the sales of ringtones to cell-phone subscribers are not 
performances but distributions of copies. See United States v. ASCAP, 607 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 441–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
Companies have learned to their peril that licensing the use from one is no defense to a suit for 
willful copyright infringement by the other. See, e.g., Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 
279 F. Supp. 2d 325 (2003).  
 189. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 88, at 550–62; Reese, supra note 184, at 240–49. 
 190. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 
2002), withdrawn, 336 F.3d 811, 815–16 (9th Cir. 2003); ASCAP, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 565; 
ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 
 191. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78, at 106–44 (testimony of Marybeth Peters, 
U.S. Register of Copyrights). 
 192. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61–65 (1976). 
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characterized as impinging on another.193 Copyright divisibility may have 
been intended to empower authors,194 but it has ended up making more 
problems than it has solved.195 
1. A Unitary Commercial Exploitation Right? 
If simplicity, legitimacy, and author- and reader-empowerment were our 
only goals, untempered by past practice, vested rights, and international 
obligations, we could do worse than to recast copyright as a single exclusive 
right with carefully drawn boundaries. If we chose to define a single core 
copyright right, the most promising candidate for that right, in my view, 
would be a right to control commercial exploitation.196 Limiting the scope 
of copyright to commercial exploitation would be simpler than the current 
array of five, six, seven, or eight197 distinct but overlapping rights. Copyright 
defined as control over commercial exploitation, moreover, would accord 
with what we know of the public’s understanding of what copyright law does, 
and should, reserve to the author.198 It would also preserve for readers, 
listeners, and viewers the liberty to enjoy works in non-exploitative ways 
without seeking licenses for each. 
A minority of copyright scholars has long insisted that the exclusive 
rights conferred by copyright are already limited, at least implicitly, to 
commercial exploitation. Ray Patterson and Judge Stanley Birch make this 
point at length in their Unified Theory of Copyright.199 Others have argued that 
uses that are not commercially exploitative should in general be deemed 
outside of the copyright owner’s control, whether under the fair-use rubric 
or otherwise.200 Still others have argued that whatever rights current law 
gives copyright owners, Congress should modify the statute to allow a broad 
swathe of noncommercial uses without the copyright owner’s permission, 
 
 193. See, e.g., Kelly, 280 F.3d at 940–44, 947–48; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004, 1022–24 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 194. Justice Ginsburg suggested as much in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 494–
97 (2001). 
 195. See Loren, supra note 88, at 698–701. 
 196. I have argued elsewhere that replacing the current exclusive rights with a right of 
commercial exploitation would improve the copyright law. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 180–86; 
accord Loren, supra note 88, at 717–18. 
 197. In addition to exclusive reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, and public 
display rights, the current statute gives differently defined public performance rights for sound 
recording copyrights and copyrights other than sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6) 
(2006). Authors of works of visual arts have separate, inalienable attribution and integrity 
rights. See id. § 106A. 
 198. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (or Why We Can’t “Just Say Yes” to Licensing), 
29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 237, 253 (1997); Litman, supra note 55, at 1912. 
 199. Patterson & Birch, supra note 28, at 293–96, 335–37, 385–95. 
 200. E.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 
975, 1017–29 (2002). 
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either subject to a new copyright exemption or to a new statutory license.201 
Copyright apologists object that the law has never incorporated a privilege 
for noncommercial use, broadly defined, and that it should not do so.202 
The line between commercial and noncommercial, they continue, is too 
elusive to bear so much weight. If a use has no commercial significance, they 
say, a copyright owner is unlikely to object. 
Although I acknowledge that the line-drawing difficulties are 
formidable,203 I think the difference between commercial exploitation and 
noncommercial enjoyment captures a distinction that is fundamental to our 
understanding of how the copyright system works. Congress has on multiple 
occasions suggested that it views the line between commercial exploitation 
and reader, listener, and viewer consumption as an implicit limit on the 
scope of copyright rights.204 Noncommercial uses further the copyright 
interest in encouraging enjoyment of works without unduly burdening the 
copyright owner’s opportunities to earn revenue through commercial 
exploitation. Major international copyright treaties bind nations to a 
promise to give copyright owners control of reproductions and public 
performances, and then permit them broad latitude to exclude 
noncommercial uses from the scope of control.205 The public tends to view 
copyright’s legitimate sphere as limited to commercial exploitation. There 
seems to be broad public support for allowing creators to control 
commercial exploitation, and very little support for allowing copyright 
owners to control noncommercial uses.206 
 
 201. E.g., FISHER, supra note 114; Netanel, supra note 114.  
 202. See, e.g., Patrick Ross, Live from Digital Hollywood: The Canary is Spain, COPYRIGHT 
ALLIANCE BLOG (May 5, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://blog.copyrightalliance.org/2010/05/live-
from-digital-hollywood-the-canary-is-spain/; Patrick Ross, Seven Sneaky Words on Fair Use, 
COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010, 2:12 PM), http://blog.copyrightalliance.org/ 
2010/03/seven-sneaky-words-on-fair-use/; Thomas D. Sydnor II, Thomas on Copyright Reform: 
An Injudicious Threat to Consumers and Artists, PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress & Freedom Found., 
Wash, D.C.), Dec. 2008, available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2008/pop15.18 
thomasreform.pdf. 
 203. See, e.g., CREATIVE COMMONS, DEFINING “NON-COMMERCIAL”: A STUDY OF HOW THE 
ONLINE POPULATION UNDERSTANDS “NON-COMMERCIAL USE” 11 (2009), available at http:// 
mirrors.creativecommons.org/defining-noncommercial/Defining_Noncommercial_fullreport. 
pdf (reporting that both creators and users consider uses that earn money or involve 
advertising as commercial, but that there is “more uncertainty than clarity” about whether other 
online uses are commercial); cf. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Evolving Role of “For Profit” Use in 
Copyright Law: Lessons from the 1909 Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 255, 
269–80 (2010) (describing courts’ efforts to construe the “for profit” limitation in the 1909 
Act). 
 204. See Litman, supra note 55, at 1904–07. 
 205. See Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-
Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 27–34 (2005). 
 206. See, e.g., PAT AUFDERHEIDE ET AL., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, AM. UNIV., THE GOOD, THE 
BAD, AND THE CONFUSING: USER-GENERATED VIDEO CREATORS ON COPYRIGHT 8 (2007), available 
at http://dspace.wrlc.org/bitstream/1961/4612/1/good_bad_confusing.pdf; MARY MADDEN, 
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Thus, defining copyright as a right to control commercial exploitation 
could give creators meaningful economic rights while preserving their 
audiences’ freedom to enjoy and interact with works in ways that further 
copyright’s core objectives.207 Eliminating the distinctions between the 
distinct rights in the copyright bundle, moreover, could give us an 
opportunity to oust the current vested intermediaries from their control of 
pieces of copyright, and return that power to the creators. 
2. Reality Check 
In a world without magic wands, though, recasting copyright as a 
unitary right to control commercial exploitation change could easily make a 
mess. When applied to extant copyrights, which are already the subject of an 
assortment of contracts and licenses, instantly converting all copyrights to a 
single commercial exploitation right would upset vested expectations, and 
would call into further question our compliance with international treaties 
that require us to give authors the right to authorize the reproduction, 
translation, performance, or communication to the public of the works they 
author.208 Adopting that approach for works not yet fixed in tangible media 
of expression would pose more modest transitional issues, but would still 
introduce considerable uncertainty. Redefining copyright as an exclusive 
commercial exploitation right would provide an opportunity to expand U.S. 
copyright rights to include an exclusive right to make a work available to the 
public (at least when the “making available” occurred in connection with 
commercial exploitation). It would also offer a more compelling rationale 
than contributory infringement for imposing liability on makers. Those 
tantalizing possibilities might well become a powerful litigation magnet. 
Meanwhile, the complications of a hybrid system, treating new works under 
new rules while retaining all of the old rules for older works, would easily 
defeat any simplification benefits the transition might seek to achieve. 
3. A More Prudent Alternative 
Could we capture the benefits of that sort of redefinition without 
throwing the copyright world into chaos? I think we could. We could do 
 
PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, ARTISTS, MUSICIANS AND THE INTERNET 75–77 (2004), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2004/Artists-Musicians-and-the-Internet.aspx; 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TULANE J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 1, 27–33 (2009).  
 207. Cf. Loren, supra note 203, at 281–84 (suggesting that the scope of copyright’s 
exclusive rights should be limited by requiring plaintiffs to prove that defendant’s use caused 
“commercial harm”). 
 208. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, arts. 8–9, 11–
14, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27. We are already arguably in breach of our treaty 
obligations because of our failure to grant authors meaningful attribution and integrity rights 
and our generous exemption for bars and restaurant to play music without getting a license to 
do so. See Gervais, supra note 205, at 14–16; Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 265–66. 
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that, I suggest, by adopting a more modest package of changes that reforms 
our current regime to make it behave, as much as feasible, as if restricting 
the scope of copyright to commercial exploitation were merely the explicit 
recognition of a limitation that had always been implicit in the law.209 We 
could accomplish that by adopting a definition of copyright’s multiple 
exclusive rights that included control over reproduction, adaptation, 
distribution, and public performance insofar as they represented 
commercial exploitation, but not otherwise. In addition, we could adopt 
other changes, also modest, to heal some of the most egregious problems of 
the current copyright system. Copyright reform should define the reach of 
copyright’s exclusive rights to give copyright owners control over uses that 
inhabit the core of the commercial exploitation of their work, leaving 
noncommercial and non-exploitative uses uncontrolled. 
Restricting the scope of copyright rights to uses involving commercial 
exploitation will not obviate the need for general privileges and limitations 
like the first sale doctrine and fair use. Such limitations arose in litigation 
over commercial uses,210 and do important work in mediating which 
commercial activities should come within a copyright owner’s control211 and 
which should not.212 When copyright is restricted to control over 
commercial exploitation, however, that should relieve the pressure on the 
law’s few general privileges to be all things to all people. 
If we choose to retain the principle that copyright is divisible into 
multiple exclusive rights each capable of separate ownership and control, we 
will need to do something to address the licensing logjam that divisible 
copyright has engendered. One obvious improvement would be to abandon 
the notion that copyright uses require multiple, distinct licenses for each 
sort of use. In earlier work, I suggested that it makes sense under current law 
to treat as impliedly licensed any reproduction, adaptation, distribution, 
performance, or display that is incidental to a licensed use.213 If we are 
reforming the law, we can go further. First, we can allow divisible copyright 
ownership without continuing to insist that each fragment of copyright is 
distinct and non-overlapping. Any transfer of a part of a copyright should be 
understood to carry with it any rights necessary to allow its exercise and 
license; entities who own copyright fragments should have a duty to account 
 
 209. See, e.g., Patterson & Birch, supra note 28, at 385–95. 
 210. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6 
(N.D. Cal. 1896).  
 211. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 
F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 212. See, e.g., Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998); 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128 
(4th Cir. 2007). 
 213. See Litman, supra note 55, at 1917.  
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to one another if they grant a license that invades a different owner’s turf, 
but it should not be the responsibility of the user seeking a license to track 
down and negotiate with all owners. Second, we can adopt a principle that 
the creator and initial copyright owner of a work retains residual authority to 
license any uses even after assignment of her copyright, subject to a duty to 
account to her assignee(s). This will help to ameliorate confusion about 
what uses require what licenses from whom, and will at the same time 
restore to creators some connection with their copyrights.214 To further 
empower creators and cut through licensing thickets, we should reform our 
current illusory termination of transfers. Finally, we should simply abolish 
the current statutory “compulsory” licenses. In the pages that follow, I 
explore these proposals in more detail. 
If copyright’s exclusive rights are limited to uses made in the course of 
commercial exploitation, and if licenses are understood to permit uses of 
works, rather than of splinters of different exclusive rights, many of the 
current pages of prose in the succeeding sections of the statute become 
unnecessary. Others may have made sense once, but function today chiefly 
to perpetuate the clout of entrenched intermediaries at creators’ and 
readers’ expense.215 Still others distort the copyright system by allowing 
older media to exploit copyrighted works on more favorable terms than 
newer media.216 If copyright’s exclusive rights are cast with appropriate 
narrowness, we can sweep away the current crop of industry-specific 
exceptions, limitations, and complications. We can retain classic general 
limits like the idea/expression distinction, the first sale doctrine and fair 
use, while leaving narrow specific exceptions behind. 
B. RECONNECT CREATORS WITH THEIR COPYRIGHTS 
In Part III, I discussed the problems for copyright’s legitimacy that arise 
when creators are divested of the copyrights in their works. Authors 
complain that they can no longer exploit or license their work, because they 
 
 214. It may once have been the case that it was easier to track down a work’s publisher than 
to find its author. In a world of media conglomerates who purchase each other’s divisions, spin 
off product lines, and liquidate in bankruptcy at a dizzying rate, an author is now far easier to 
track down than her assorted assignees, their successors, and their respective assignees. It also 
seems more likely that an author will have kept track of what publisher bought her publisher 
than that a publisher will know how to find all of the authors whose contracts it assumed when 
it purchased the company that purchased the company that initially held the authors’ contracts. 
See, e.g., PATRICK BURKART & TOM MCCOURT, DIGITAL MUSIC WARS: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
OF THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 24–37 (Andrew Calabrese ed., 2006); ALBERT N. GRECO, THE BOOK 
PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 51–65 (2d ed. 2005). Thus, plaintiff record companies in Napster insisted 
that it would be difficult or impossible for them to identify the works on whose behalf they 
brought suit. A & M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2000), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 215. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). 
 216. E.g., id. §§ 111, 112, 114, 119. 
LITMAN_PDF.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/2010  1:48 PM 
48 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1 
assigned the copyright to an intermediary who refuses to release it.217 In 
theory, the termination-of-transfers right should address it, but the 
termination right has turned out to be largely illusory. We can reunite 
creators with their copyrights and achieve significant disintermediation at 
the same time by replacing our current fake termination right with a real 
one.218 Authors should be entitled to terminate any copyright grant they 
make, on five years notice, at any time beginning fifteen years after the date 
of the grant and continuing for the life of the copyright. Termination 
should continue to be subject, as it is under current law, to an exception 
allowing grantees to continue to exploit any derivative works created during 
the grant, but not to make new ones. The combination of a five-year notice 
period and a derivative works exception should give copyright 
intermediaries enough protection to make investment in copyrighted works 
worthwhile without vesting them with excessive control.219 Meanwhile, the 
potential for termination at an earlier date may encourage intermediaries to 
structure their initial agreements for copyright acquisition in more creator-
friendly forms. 
C. RECOGNIZE READERS’ RIGHTS 
Limiting the scope of copyright to commercial exploitation will go a 
significant way towards reinvigorating copyright law’s traditional solicitude 
for readers, viewers, and listeners, and should enable them to enjoy 
copyrighted works in both consumptive and creative ways without unduly 
undermining the copyright owners’ commercial incentives.220 I would, 
however, go further. I believe that it would enhance the legitimacy of the 
copyright system if the copyright statute included explicit recognition of the 
core importance of reader, listener, and viewer liberties to enjoy copyrighted 
works without undue copyright owner interference. If copyright law 
expressly recognized that reader, listener, and viewer interests must 
 
 217. See Jonathan Band, Publish and Perish? Protecting Your Copyrights from Your Publisher, 
ASCB NEWSLETTER, (Am. Soc’y for Cell Biology, Bethesda, Md.), May 2008, available at http:// 
www.policybandwidth.com/doc/20080523-PublishANDPerishFinal.pdf; Comments of Recording 
Artist Groups on Orphan Works, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Mar. 25, 2005), http://futureof 
music.org/filing/comments-recording-artist-groups-orphan-works. See generally KEEP YOUR 
COPYRIGHTS, http://www.keepyourcopyrights.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
 218. Other scholars have proposed different reforms that would be useful contributions to 
efforts to strengthen the perceived connection between creators and their copyrights, such as 
enacting an express attribution right. See Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 286–88.  
 219. That probably won’t prevent some assignees from seeking to avoid termination by 
claiming that the works are works made for hire. See, e.g., Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th 
Cong. (2000) (testimony of Marybeth Peters, U.S. Register of Copyrights). In order to 
safeguard authors’ opportunities to exercise their broadened termination rights, we should 
probably narrow and perhaps eliminate the category of commissioned works made for hire 
under the second prong of the definition in § 101.  
 220. See Litman, supra note 66, at 179–83. 
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sometimes be protected against overreaching creators and distributors, it 
would be much easier for members of the public to invest in the principle 
that copyright should protect creators and distributors from exploitative 
readers, listeners, and viewers. 
An additional reform that strikes me as useful is the creation of a 
position, within the Copyright Office but independent of its bureaucracy, for 
a copyright ombudsman to explain the copyright system to the public and 
articulate the public’s interest to the staff of the Copyright Office and to 
Congress. I’ve explored in earlier work some of the reasons why it has been 
difficult for Congress, the Copyright Office, or a variety of copyright-affected 
organizations that have purported to speak for the public on particular 
issues to represent the public in any reliable way.221 It may not actually 
achieve much to give the job to a lawyer with instructions to consult his 
client; different actors’ notions of the public interest in copyright are 
exceptionally diverse.222 But as innovations go, it’s an inexpensive one with 
the potential to make a difference. 
D. DISLODGE ENTRENCHED INTERMEDIARIES 
Assume a willing licensee who desires to license a copyrighted work on 
terms that the copyright owner would find acceptable. A functioning 
copyright system should make it easy to strike that deal. If the licensee 
cannot identify the appropriate licensor or divine the license terms; if the 
copyright owner cannot discover who has already exploited her work and 
who would like to do so, the system will entail tremendous waste. Where the 
value of an individual use is dwarfed by the transaction costs of negotiating a 
license, the U.S. copyright system has either completely excused unlicensed 
uses,223 or allowed the uses under blanket collective224 or statutory225 
 
 221. See Litman, supra note 153, at 53–54; Litman, supra note 9, at 299–301, 311–16. 
 222. Compare, e.g., Neil Turkewitz, Copyright, Fair Use and the Public Interest, CULTURAL 
COMMONS (Dec. 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/20050831033648/www.cultural 
commons.org/comment-print.cfm?ID=22, with, e.g., PATRY, supra note 30, at 101–02. 
 223. For example, a sports bar publicly performs games broadcast by ABC. The 
performance of the music accompanying the broadcast is exempt under 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) 
(2006). 
 224. For example, the local ABC affiliate broadcasts the game to viewers in its local service 
area, having secured blanket performance licenses from ASCAP, BMI and SESAC to broadcast 
the music accompanying the game. 
 225. For example, Comcast Cablevision transmits the ABC broadcast to its subscribers, 
having paid a statutory license fee under 17 U.S.C. § 111 to permit its retransmission. The fee 
will be combined with other fees and then divided at the end of the year between motion 
picture studios, major sports leagues, ASCAP, BMI and SESAC, and others who claim copyright 
ownership in programming transmitted over cable under the § 111 license. See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–805; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. Librarian of Cong., 146 F.3d 907, 911–12 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). A similar regime applies to satellite television. See 17 U.S.C. § 119. A dissimilar and 
horribly complex regime covers the digital transmission of recorded music by satellite radio and 
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licenses. Collective licenses are devised by performing rights organizations 
who operate within constraints imposed by antitrust consent decrees.226 
Compulsory licenses are statutory, although their terms were devised by 
representatives of copyright owners and the statutory licensees before 
congressional enactment.227 
Although copyright theorists talk about copyright licensing as an 
individually negotiated transaction between a creator and a distributor,228 
much licensing of copyright works involves statutory or collective licenses. 
Statutory or “compulsory” licenses are, in practice, not very different from 
collective licenses. Both are hybrids of statutory benchmarks with private 
bargaining; both involve significant government oversight and expensive 
negotiation; both are better at collecting royalties than disbursing them.229 
Together, the various statutory licenses form a patchwork of irreconcilable 
terms, inconsistent prices and procedures, and the expensive necessity for 
many-stop shopping for innovative uses.230 
The music performance collecting societies, meanwhile, are hardly 
poster children for unregulated private market transactions. Both ASCAP 
and BMI operate within the constraints of detailed antitrust decrees, limiting 
their acquisition and control of copyright rights, defining the class of 
members they must agree to admit, restricting the scope and terms of the 
licenses they may grant, forbidding them from discriminating in license 
price among similarly situated licensees or interfering with their members’ 
ability to offer competing licenses, obliging them to make a list of works they 
are entitled to license available to the public, and instructing them how to 
 
Internet webcasters. See id. §§ 114, 115; United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 226. See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 275–77 (2009); Loren, 
supra note 88. 
 227. See generally Licensing Information, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/ 
licensing/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) (providing information and forms related to licensing). 
 228. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 218–36; Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in 
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
 229. The performing rights organizations divide royalties among their members according 
to each organization’s secret formula. Most of the compulsory license royalties are, in theory, 
allocated among claimants by copyright royalty judges. The statutory sections that call for 
license fees to be paid into a common fund and then divided among claimants don’t include 
provisions that would assist the copyright royalty judges charged with disbursing the royalties to 
allocate the funds in the pot. Rather, the statute encourages claimants to negotiate among 
themselves to arrive at both the royalty rates and a division that they find satisfactory. See 17 
U.S.C. §§ 111(d), 112(e)(2), 114(e), 118(b)(2), 119(c), 803(b)(3), 805, 1007. In the three 
decades since the 1976 act took effect, copyright owner claimants have pursued a strategy of 
driving the cost of claiming a share up to levels that discourage claimants unless they are 
represented by collecting societies or big trade associations, and then negotiating with the 
remaining big fish to divide the spoils. 
 230. See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 78, at 106–44 (testimony of Mary Beth Peters); 
Loren, supra note 88. 
LITMAN_PDF.DOC 10/28/2010  1:48 PM 
2010] REAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 51 
divide up and distribute the royalties they collect.231 The pricing of ASCAP 
and BMI licenses, moreover, is subject to review by a federal court. Thus 
both compulsory licenses and collective licenses are extensively cabined by 
government regulation, and both feature terms derived through private 
negotiation. Recent efforts to replace complicated compulsory or collective 
license procedures with something more streamlined have foundered on 
each entrenched intermediary’s efforts to preserve its particular slice of the 
pie. The Creative Commons has devised forms and procedures to simplify 
licensing of uncompensated uses of copyrighted material.232 Its efforts to 
field comparable commercial licenses have thus far been less successful.233 
With that background, one approach to the problems of licensing 
suggests itself. De-trenching current intermediaries would serve both 
simplification and disintermediation goals. If we forget about politics, the 
easiest way to get there is to junk all of the statutory licenses, return licensing 
authority to the individual authors of each work, and see whether those who 
rely on the licenses find it worthwhile to devise voluntary collective licenses 
to replace them. Any new collective licenses would of course beget new 
intransigent intermediaries to administer them. To limit the damage from 
re-entrenching intermediaries, therefore, the law should allow these 
collecting agents to operate without heightened antitrust scrutiny only to the 
extent that they meet significant statutory conditions derived from what 
we’ve learned in seventy years of antitrust scrutiny of ASCAP and BMI, 
crafted to ensure transparency and competition, and designed to make 
retrenchment difficult.234 To ensure that, at least as an initial matter, these 
agents represent the creators whose works they license, it might be wise to 
require the collecting agents to pay creators’ shares of the royalties directly 
to the creators, as ASCAP, BMI, and SoundExchange do today, rather than 
funneling the payments through the copyright owners.235 
A law adopting the reforms suggested thus far would represent a shift 
from a model based on concentrating the ownership of copyright rights into 
the hands of a single entity whenever possible, to a model encouraging non-
 
 231. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *6–8 (S.D.N.Y. June 
11, 2001); United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966), modified, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see Crane, supra note 226. 
 232. See License Your Work, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/choose/ (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
 233. See CCPlus, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Ccplus (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2010); Metadata Lab, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://labs.creativecommons.org/demos/ 
metadata/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
 234. Such conditions might include provisions that collecting agents may administer only 
nonexclusive rights, must accept as members anyone who seeks membership and allow any 
current member to defect to a competitor, must offer per use as well as blanket licenses, must 
make lists of works they license readily available to public, and must make the terms of division 
and payment readily available to both members and licensees. 
 235. See Litman, supra note 88, at 43–44. 
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exclusive exploitation by multiple entities. In many ways, U.S. copyright law 
began to move in that direction when Congress adopted divisibility of 
copyright, but was stymied by the problems attending licensing. If we can 
solve the licensing snafus without concentrating all copyright control in a 
small number of hands, we can build a system that is friendlier to creators, 
friendlier to readers, and friendlier to a wide swathe of different 
intermediaries, without giving current players excessive incentives to elbow 
new entrants out of the picture frame. 
E.  SUMMARY 
My proposals are modest. I’ve suggested that we limit copyright’s 
exclusive rights to uses that involve commercial exploitation. I’ve proposed 
that we subject copyright assignments to an author’s residual authority to 
grant licenses, subject to a duty to account, and that we treat uses incidental 
to licensed uses as impliedly authorized. I have recommended that we 
reinvigorate termination of transfers, and expressly recognize reader 
liberties. Finally, I’ve proposed that we abolish the current statutory licenses. 
These proposals leave the broad outlines of copyright law in place. They 
don’t seek to “turn copyright on its head,”236 limit its duration to the span 
envisioned by the framers,237 or require the United States to withdraw from 
or seek to rewrite international copyright treaties.238 Because my goals 
reinforce one another, it is possible to accomplish a fair amount of 
improvement with relatively small adjustments. Getting rid of more than 200 
pages full of complicated and historically contingent limitations, restrictions, 
exceptions, conditions, provisos, and complexities does much of the heavy 
lifting. It makes the law shorter, simpler, and easier to explain. I don’t 
pretend that it will be possible to keep a new statute short and simple. In 
time, even a spanking-clean copyright law will acquire its own set of 
historically contingent complexities. But, at least we will have started from 
the conditions that plague us in the twenty-first century rather than carrying 
forward the ones we adopted to address the ills of the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, or twentieth. 
 
 236. Keith Kupferschmid, Are Authors and Publishers Getting Scroogled?, INFORMATION TODAY, 
Dec. 1, 2005, 2005 WLNR 22457424; see Edward Wyatt, Google Library Database Is Delayed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at B9 (quoting Patricia Schroeder, President of the Association of 
American Publishers).  
 237. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 133–35 (2004); see also Rufus Pollock, Forever 
Minus a Day? Calculating Optimal Copyright Term (June 15, 2009) (unpublished working 
paper), available at http://www.rufuspollock.org/economics/papers/optimal_copyright_term. 
pdf. 
 238. See FISHER, supra note 114, at 248–49.  
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V. GETTING THERE FROM HERE 
I boasted earlier that the conventions of legal scholarship allow me to 
propose copyright reforms that I cannot realistically imagine Congress’s 
enacting. That permitted me to put off, until now, the question of the 
prudence of entrusting control of copyright reform to the owners of 
twentieth-century copyrights, and the related question of whether it is 
possible to dislodge them. 
In the previous Part, I made a series of suggestions for reforming the 
copyright law to address the most troubling problems of the current 
copyright system. The reforms I outlined were more in the nature of 
copyright repairs than copyright revolt. They seek to improve the operation 
of the copyright system for creators and for readers, listeners, and viewers 
without wholesale demolition. They also seek to diminish the incentives of 
vested intermediaries, but to make licensing easier. Finally, they are crafted 
to improve the system’s legitimacy. They join a large collection of thoughtful 
proposals by proponents of copyright reform across the spectrum of 
copyright politics.239 None of these proposals is likely to attract serious 
attention from Congress or copyright lobbyists. 
Right now the copyright-legislation playing field is completely 
controlled by its beneficiaries. They have persuaded Congress that it is 
pointless to try to enact copyright laws without their assent. They are 
unlikely to countenance a statute that disempowers them in meaningful 
ways. Even if copyright lobbyists are privately persuaded of the wisdom of a 
reform proposal, they are unlikely to agree to it if it leaves their clients worse 
off than before. To accomplish real copyright reform, then, we will need to 
change the way that copyright laws are made.240 That may be an impossible 
task, at least in the near term. Members of Congress are unlikely to consider 
untried approaches unless they believe that their constituents expect it of 
them, will pay attention, and may take it into account when they vote. The 
first step in that direction, though, is to encourage a broader conversation 
about why the copyright system isn’t working and what kinds of changes 
might be possible. 
We can’t trust the copyright clergy to initiate that conversation on our 
behalf. They don’t need to. They can rely on rhetoric that brands any 
 
 239. E.g., id.; KWALL, supra note 184; Gervais, supra note 23; Ginsburg, supra note 64; 
LESSIG, supra note 237; Netanel, supra note 114; Reichman, Dinwoodie & Samuelson, supra 
note 114; Samuelson, supra note 114; Sprigman, supra note 184. 
 240. Accord Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using 
Creative Motivation To Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1 (2008); Samuelson, supra note 
114; Lawrence Lessig, Required Reading: The Next 10 Years, LESSIG 2.0 (June 19, 2007, 2:07 AM), 
http://lessig.org/blog/2007/06/required_reading_the_next_10_y_1.html.  
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copyright critique as “anti-copyright,”241 “anti-author,”242 anti-property,243 
and an attack on creators’ livelihoods.244 Copyright reformers who make 
proposals that won’t inure to the benefit of extant copyright owners are said 
to pursue the religion of “information wants to be free.”245 Copyright 
owners warn that rebalancing the law to limit copyright owners’ control will 
kill the goose that lays the golden egg.246 Authors’ advocates go along, 
pinning their hopes on the promise that if copyright owners can only 
persuade Congress to strengthen their hands sufficiently, some of the 
benefits of enhanced copyright will trickle down to creators. 
That seems improbable. If Congress’s repeated copyright 
enhancements have not yet manifested themselves in greater creator wealth, 
it might be that even very large increases in the scope and value of copyright 
are unlikely to have a perceptible effect on creators because the structure of 
the current U.S. copyright system allows creators to capture so small a slice 
of copyright. It would take massive additional copyright protection before 
any measurable improvement for creators would show up. So long as the 
advocates for copyright expansion are permitted to claim the pro-author 
mantle, however, the idea that creators might be better off if distributors’ 
rights were narrower is a difficult sell. 
Rebutting the notion that copyright owners speak for authors, or that 
their interests are usually aligned, then, may be a crucial strategic move. The 
recent polarization of copyright discourse makes the approach trickier than 
it might have been ten or twenty years ago. We’ve been arguing for so long 
that advocates have grown immune to reason and example.247 Even if the 
 
 241. Turkewitz, supra note 222; see, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at xiv–xv, 33–39; James V. 
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IN THE INFORMATION AGE 17, 17–18 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr. eds., 2002). 
 242. See, e.g., HELPRIN, supra note 65, at xiv, 99–100, 216–17; Marci A. Hamilton, The 
Distant Drumbeat: Why the Law Still Matters in the Information Era, in THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: 
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Carnes, President, Songwriters Guild of America). 
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679. The phrase, attributed by Wikipedia to Stewart Brand, author of the Whole Earth Catalog, 
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benefits of a simpler, shorter, more legitimate law were obvious to all 
copyright-affected interests, the current climate would make such proposals 
controversial. Focusing on specific reforms that might make copyright law 
more creator-friendly as well as more reader-friendly may give us a small 
wedge that will allow further conversation. One of copyright’s most 
important functions should be to facilitate connections between creators 
and readers, listeners, and viewers. If creators and readers examine the ways 
the current copyright system fails to do this, both groups may question 
whether continuing to cede copyright lawmaking to copyright owners is 
wise. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our copyright system still bears the imprint of its original design. In 
1790, reproduction and distribution were expensive, and Congress chose to 
give authors narrow, short-lived, alienable rights in the works they created 
and to encourage them to transfer those rights to distributors in return for 
publication and, sometimes, a little money. Distribution is no longer so 
expensive. Copyright rights are no longer so narrow. Copyright terms are no 
longer short. Copyrights are still, however, alienable, and the system still 
encourages creators to convey all of their rights to distributors in return for 
dissemination and, sometimes, a little money. The justifications for 
concentrating copyrights in distributors’ hands make less sense today, when 
copyrights last lifetimes and cover myriad uses that might intrigue different 
sorts of distributors at different times, and when mass distribution no longer 
requires massive capital investment. 
The opportunities offered by inexpensive digital distribution allow us to 
think seriously about enhancing copyright’s legitimacy by building the 
copyright system so that it better meets the needs of creators and of readers, 
viewers, and listeners. That’s a conversation that all of us need to be having, 
now, while copyright revision is still just beginning. 
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